司法裁量無可避免？－以德沃金法理論反思台灣司法判決

Is Judicial Discretion Inevitable? A Reflection on Some Legal Cases in Taiwan from the Perspective of Ronald Dworkin's Legal Theory

莊季凡(Chi-Fan Chuang)

指導教授 ： 莊世同

國立臺灣大學/法律學院/法律學研究所/碩士(2016年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201603488

摘要

裁量為法學上重要論題，於法晦澀之處，似乎留給決定者自由選擇的空間，裁量被視為法治國家中的人為因素，它既可讓平等、正義、公平等價值得以張顯，也可能造成司法濫權甚至傷害民主，因此，司法裁量可說是「法治」與「人治」的交會點，法概念論與法價值論的匯流，此特殊的地位使裁量為法學歷久彌新之課題。
然而，裁量是隨脈絡變化的不精確語詞，論文題目所研究之司法裁量範疇為「法官對個案法律適用疑義時，窮盡所有方式仍有兩個以上答案」，這種裁量是否無可避免？英美法理學上的討論係以法律與裁量的關係為主軸，「法律是什麼」將影響「裁量是什麼」，本文以哈特（H. L. A. Hart）和德沃金（Ronald Dworkin）在法概念及司法裁量之論辯，探討司法裁量之意義與相關議題。
本文前半篇是理論研究，後半篇為我國司法實務考察，採取從法理論到司法實務整體觀點，再到具體個案的論述架構。第二章研究哈特和德沃金兩位學者在法概念和司法裁量之論辯，第三章從政治道德視角論法律詮釋、裁量和價值中立的相關問題，第四章從實務上考察我國法院之司法裁量觀為何，第五章藉由行政首長特別費案及司法院釋字第721號政黨比例代表選舉案，論析徘徊在裁量與解釋之間的司法判決。
司法裁量是一種裁判理論宣稱，建立在價值中立的法概念上，但法律是一種詮釋性概念，不可能跳脫價值而能夠理解法律，本文結論認為，司法裁量並非無可避免，法官以建構性詮釋達到法律本旨的最佳理解，是比承認司法裁量、交由法官價值選擇，更嚴謹、更與憲法權力分立結構融貫的裁判態度。

關鍵字

司法裁量 ； 德沃金 ； 哈特 ； 建構性詮釋 ； 法治 ； 民主 ； 特別費案 ； 釋字第721號解釋

並列摘要

Discretion is an important topic in jurisprudence. When law is not clear, it seems that law leaves some space where decision-makers have freedom to choose. Discretion is regarded as an individual factor in rule of law: it may realize equality, justice or fair, but it may be abused to threaten our democracy. Thus we can say that judicial discretion is not only an intersection of “rule of law” and“rule by man”but also relates to“concept of law” and “axiology of law”. As a result of this special character, discretion becomes a controversial issue of legal theory for a long time.
However, there are some ambiguity in the concept of discretion. The precise meaning of discretion is affected by features of the context. The word “judicial discretion”in the title of this essay “Is Judicial Discretion Inevitable?”means that there are more than one answer in a legal case when judges have difficulty in applying the law.In this sense, this essay concerns whether judicial discretion is inevitable. Moreover, “what is law” may affect “what is discretion”. Therefore,it　directs its attention to the relation of law and discretion from view of legal philosophy.This essay will start from Hart-Dworkin debate on the concept of law and judicial discretion to explore the meaning of judicial discretion and its related issue.
This essay includes three parts: legal theory, statistic of judgments, and case study. In chapter two,it introduces Hart-Dworkin debate on concept of law and judicial discretion. In chapter three, it deeply discusses problems of interpretation, discretion, and value-free from the perspective of Dworkin’s legal and political philosophy. In chapter four, it explores the concept of judicial discretion in Taiwan’s court by searching judgments of Supreme Court. In chapter five, it analyzes and criticizes Governor Special Allowances Case and Election of the Political Party Proportional Representatives Case(Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.721).
Judicial discretion is a claim based on value-free legal theory, but I argue that law is an interpretive concept and cannot be understood out of value. It is concluded that judicial discretion is not inevitable. If judge’s decision can be drawn from constructive interpretation that both fits and justifies the political structure and legal doctrine of community in some coherent set of principles about people’s rights and duties, in this way,it will be a more rigorous attitude and more compatible with democracy and separation of power than we admit judicial discretion that lets the judge choose freely.

並列關鍵字

Judicial Discretion ； Ronald Dworkin ； H. L. A. Hart ； Constructive Interpretation ； Rule of Law ； Democracy ； Governor Special Allowances ； J. Y.Interpretation No.721

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