Title

勞退新制下企業因應策略之研究

Translated Titles

A Research on Firm’s Choice of Strategies Regarding Labor Pension Act

DOI

10.6342/NTU.2007.01345

Authors

許建彬

Key Words

勞退新制 ; 新制度論 ; 資源依存論 ; 策略選擇 ; 制度環境 ; 行動者 ; Labor Pension Act ; New Institutionalism ; Resource Dependence ; Strategy ; Institutional Environment ; Agency

PublicationName

臺灣大學社會學研究所學位論文

Volume or Term/Year and Month of Publication

2007年

Academic Degree Category

碩士

Advisor

柯志哲

Content Language

繁體中文

Chinese Abstract

在勞基法中所規定之舊制退休金對於老年經濟保障並無法達成實質之效果下,勞退新制的設立與實施乃是試圖重新建立這層保障。然而作為這層義務之承擔者的企業,對於勞退新制是否能發揮預期中之效果,具有著關鍵性的影響力;其可能透過各種調整策略之採行,對於勞退新制所加之於企業的人事成本壓力進行逃避或轉嫁,從而導致勞退新制失去其設立的美意。 對於企業面對勞退新制之態度及其所採行之因應策略,本文嘗試著結合新制度論對於制度壓力之觀點,及資源依存論對於行動者之論點,以釐清勞退新制對於企業之意涵。並修正組織面臨制度壓力時之策略選擇的理論模型,以對於影響企業在降低人事成本與追求合法性之間進行權衡之因素進行研究;另一方面,也透過此處論點之延伸,對於企業採行各項調整策略之影響因素進行探索。 研究結果顯示,當勞退新制使得企業決策者在企業薪資與人力運用規劃上之決策自主權受到越多的限縮時,則其越傾向於追求有效降低人事成本、反抗勞退新制之規定及犧牲員工利益的策略。而員工作為組織關係人的角色,在舊制時未足額提撥之企業中,則是透過對於企業決策所具有的影響力及企業對於潛在員工之重視程度兩層關係,抑制著企業犧牲合法性以追求有效降低人事成本的傾向。 在企業選擇各項因應策略上,企業在薪資及人力運用規劃上之決策權受限縮的程度,也同樣是使得企業採行多項調整策略之影響因素;當受限縮的程度越高,則整體而言企業採行調整策略以因應勞退新制的可能性越高。此外,人事成本佔總成本的比率越高,則其採行派遣或外包策略的可能性越高。勞退新制下企業人事成本提高的程度越高,則其採用資遣後重新聘用之作法的可能性也越高。企業對於成本競爭策略的重視程度及尋找適任員工的困難程度越高,則其採行調整薪資結構的可能性也越高。而企業對於內部勞動市場的重視程度則是與調整薪資結構採行的可能性呈反向關係、與採行規劃留才制度呈正向的關係。 整體的研究結果,在理論上較支持資源依存論中對於行動者之主動性的肯認,即:組織面臨制度壓力時是隨著決策者對於相關因素的考量,從而在順從或反抗之間進行抉擇,全然的順從僅是可能採行的策略之一。然而新制度論所提出的鬆散並置(de-coupling)與企業因應勞退新制的作法之間,也具有著高度的相似性,唯在新制度論之理論架構下,行動者的角色仍居於較為被動的位置。 而在經驗意義上,勞退新制對於建立起老年經濟另一層保障之貢獻,似乎並不如表面上企業提繳情況之數據所顯示的那樣樂觀。就企業對於降低人事成本的考量普遍高於其對合法性的重視、在企業自身長期營運的考量下趨於對前者的追求而犧牲後者、及企業隨其考量而採行不同策略以因應勞退新制來看,勞退新制下企業普遍抱持著轉嫁或逃避這層人事費用的心態,而數據也顯示有近七成的企業實際採行了調整薪資結構或使用派遣或外包的作法。就此而言,勞退新制下人事費用增加及相關負面效果的實際承擔者仍然是員工。

English Abstract

A new pension system has replaced the old one since July 1, 2005, because the old system has failed to provide effective old-age protection. However, whether the Labor Pension Act will work or not, depends largely on the attitude and the strategic choice of firms which bear the rising labor cost. By adopting various kinds of strategies, the firms could avoid the additional labor cost imposed by the Labor Pension Act or shift the cost to employees. In both cases, the Labor Pension Act could fail to achieve the expected results. To investigate firms’ attitude and the strategic responses to the Labor Pension Act, I combined both the concept of institutional environment relations supported by the new institutionalism and the role of agent discussed by the resource dependence theory to clarify the relationship between firms and institutional pressure imposed by the Labor Pension Act. The framework used to explore organizational responsiveness to institutional pressures is modified to identify the determinants of firm’s choice between labor cost and legitimacy. Moreover, I also did an exploratory investigation about the factors which made firms adopting a specific strategy. I found that the more the Labor Pension Act restricts autonomy of a firm in human resource planning, the more cost-efficient and the less legitimate strategies the firm adopts. Higher degree of restriction also makes the firms adopt more strategies to respond. Besides, employees are proved to have the power to suppress the inclination of a firm in pursuing more cost-efficient but less legitimate strategies. To what degree can employees interfere in the firm’s decision-making process and how much firm cares about potential eligible employee both have impact on the strategic choice of a firm. The restriction of autonomy of a firm in human resource planning is also an important factor concerning the firm’s choice of strategies. The more the restriction is, the more strategies firm adopts. Beside, the higher the ratio of labor cost to total cost, the higher the possibility of adopting outsourcing. The more the total cost rises, the more possible the “re-employment after layoff” strategy is adopted. The more a firm considers the cost-leadership strategy as the main competitive strategy, and the more difficult a firm finds eligible employees, the more salary-related strategies are used. The importance of the internal labor market to the firm is negatively related to the possibility of adopting a salary strategy, and positively related to the possibility of adopting a retaining plan. The final result supports the concept of autonomy of the agent in the resource dependence theory. How the institutional pressure affecting organizations depends largely on the consideration and the choice of strategies of decision-maker. Totally submitting to the requirements imposed by the institutional pressure is only one of the choices. However, the concept of de-coupling raised by the new institutionalism can also properly capture the way a firm responds to the Labor Pension Act. Yet, under the theoretical framework of the new institutionalism, the autonomy of the agent is still much restricted. The empirical results show that the Labor Pension Act is not so effective as reported. Firm’s weighing cost effectiveness over legitimacy and adopting various kinds of strategy considering the Labor Pension Act, points out that a firm is trying to avoid or to transfer the extra labor cost imposed by the Labor Pension Act. Actually, there are nearly 70% of firms adopt either salary strategies or outsourcing. Under this situation, employee is still the one who bears the extra labor cost and the negative results incurred by the Labor Pension Act.

Topic Category 社會科學院 > 社會學研究所
社會科學 > 社會學
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