Title

以拍賣賽局理論分析第二價格競標之效益與實證

Translated Titles

Second-price bid benefit analysis and empirical experiment by auction game theory

DOI

10.6342/NTU.2012.03035

Authors

蔡宗翰

Key Words

台灣公共工程 ; 最低價格競標 ; 第二價格同質公共工程競標 ; 賽局理論 ; 保留價格 ; 競租行為 ; 柏拉圖效率 ; Public Constructions ; Lowest Price Tendering ; Second Price Homogeneity Public Construction Tendering ; Game Theory ; Reserved Price ; Rent-Seeking Activities ; Pareto Efficiency

PublicationName

臺灣大學土木工程學研究所學位論文

Volume or Term/Year and Month of Publication

2012年

Academic Degree Category

碩士

Advisor

荷世平

Content Language

繁體中文

Chinese Abstract

台灣公共工程大多採取最低價格競標,然而最低價格競標有許多讓人詬病的問題,希望能夠尋找、研究並驗證是否有更好的投標制度,能提升公共工程的品質,也提升廠商的利益、政府的利益,甚至是公共工程使用者,全民的利益。 諾貝爾經濟學獎得主William Vickery在不完全經濟學領域的貢獻良多,提出維氏拍賣(Second price bid auction)是其重要貢獻之一,本研究希望利用維氏拍賣之概念,發展一具有許多優點的公共工程投標機制。「第二價格同質公共工程競標」即為此招標機制之名稱。第二價格同質公共工程競標之規則為所有廠商參與一次密封(sealed)的投標,由投標價格最低的廠商得標,但得標者可得第二低價作為得標者之工程費用。 本研究使用採用賽局理論(Game theory)分析此規則之效益,並採用實驗設計之研究方法驗證理論之效果。在一定的假設下,透過賽局理論的分析,本研究確認第二價格競標可以使所有參與投標之廠商寫下其保留價格、減少廠商與公務員間的聯誼、勾結等競租行為,並可以確保成本最低廠商得標,使社會效率最高達到柏拉圖效率。而透過實驗設計的實證結果顯示,在此規則下廠商不會立刻依照理論出價,但隨著經驗的增加出價行為逐漸接近理論值。此實驗結果支持理論推導之效果,本制度可供後續研究持續改善並改善現實公共工程之部分問題。

English Abstract

Name of Institute:Construction and Engineering Management Program of Department of Civil Engineering, National Taiwan University Graduate Date:January, 2013 Degree Conferred:Master Name of Student:Tsung-Han, Tsai Advisor:Shih-Ping Ho, Ph.D. Most of the Taiwan public constructions use the lowest price bid to determine the contractor. However, the lowest price bid have some criticized issues, This research wants to find, research, and verify a better mechanism for public construction tendering in order to improve the quality of public construction, the interests of the manufacturers or the government's interests, even benefit users of public constructions, improve social interests. Nobel Prize in economics winner William Vickery, who contribute to incomplete economics proposed Vickers auction. (Second price bid auction) This research hopes to use the Vickers auction concept to develop a tendering mechanism for public constructions, "The second price homogeneity public construction tendering". Second price homogeneity public construction tendering rule is: For all bidders who participate, each could hand in a sealed tender bid. The lowest bidder win the tendering, while the winning bidder gets the second-low bid price as construction project costs. This research use Game theory to analyze the benefits of this rule, and verify the effect of the theory by experimental design research methods. Under certain assumptions, through the analysis of game theory, this study confirmed that the second price homogeneity public construction tendering can make every participating contractor write down its reserve price, to reduce coordinate, collusion and other rent-seeking behavior between contractors and civil servants. This rule can also ensure the lowest-cost contractor wins the bid. Social welfare will be maximized, and Pareto efficiency will achieve automatically. The empirical results show that through experimental design, every contractor under this rule will not immediately bid according with the theoretical bid, but will gradually close to the theoretical value when bidders gain experience. The experimental results support the theory inference. This rule is available for follow-up research continues to improve and contribute some of the problems solving in the reality world of public constructions.

Topic Category 工學院 > 土木工程學研究所
工程學 > 土木與建築工程
Reference
  1. 6.張宇樑、吳宿椒譯,《研究設計:質化、量化及混合方法取向》,學富文化,2007年(原作:John W. Creswell (2004), Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches, Sage Publications, Inc)
    連結:
  2. 9.蔡宗翰,「顧客族群消長之分析與應用」,台灣大學國際企業學系碩士論文,2012年
    連結:
  3. 2.Charles Noussair(2004) “Revealing consumers’ willingness-to-pay: A comparison of the BDM mechanism and the Vickrey auction” Journal of Economic Psychology 25 (2004)725–741
    連結:
  4. 3.Friedman, L. (1956), “Psychoanalysis and the foundation of ethics.” The Journal of Philosophy, 53. 15-20.
    連結:
  5. 4.Frensch, Peter A.; Sternberg, Robert J,” Expertise and intelligent thinking: When is it worse to know better?”, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc, 1989
    連結:
  6. 7.Lopomo, G. (1998). “The English auction is optional among simple sequential auction.” Journal of Economic Theory, 82(1), 144-166.
    連結:
  7. 8.Milgrom, P. and Weber, R. (1982), “A theory of auction and competitive bidding.” Econometrica, 50, 1089-1122.
    連結:
  8. 10.Paul Green(1978), Analyzing Mutivariate Data
    連結:
  9. 11.Rasmusen, Eric, “Games and Information– An Introduction to Game Theory,” Basil Blackwell, 1989.
    連結:
  10. 13.Wilson, R. (1977), “A bidding model of perfect competition.” Review of Economic Studies, 4, 511-518.
    連結:
  11. 14.Vickery, W. (1960), “Utility, Strategy, and Social decision rules.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 74, 507-555.
    連結:
  12. 15.Vickery, W. (1961), “Counter speculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders.” Journal of France, 16, 8-37.
    連結:
  13. 一、中文部分
  14. 1.王明德,《賽局理論在工程領域之應用》,台大土木所課程講義,2010年
  15. 2.王道一,《實驗經濟學方法論》,台大經濟系課堂講義,2009年
  16. 3.林震岩,《多變量分析SPSS的操作與應用》,智勝文化,2007年
  17. 4.邱琛智,「公共工程採購應用合格最低標之研究」,中央大學土木工程學系碩士論文,2002年
  18. 5.張立中,「估計價值的不同以及存在出價成本下的ebay拍賣」,中山大學經濟碩士論文,2009年
  19. 7.張維迎,《賽局理論與信息經濟學》,茂昌出版社,2000年
  20. 8.黃俊英,《多變量分析》,中國經企研究所,2007年
  21. 10.楊雲明,《個體經濟學》,智勝文化,2003年
  22. 11.謝淑貞,《賽局理論》,雙葉書廊,1995年
  23. 二、 英文部分
  24. 1.Babbie, E, ”Survey research methods,” Wadsworth, 2001.
  25. 5.Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole, “Game Theory,” MIT press, 1995.
  26. 6.Keppel, G,”Design and analysis: A researcher handbook,” Sage,1991.
  27. 9.Myerson, R. B. (1981), “Optimal auction design.” Mathematics of Operation Research, 6, 58-73.
  28. 12.Riley, J. G. and Saumelson, W. F. (1981). “Optimal auctions.” American Economic Review, 71, 381-392.
Times Cited
  1. 賴曉群(2013)。跨國聯合承攬組織衝突之研究-理論與實證分析。臺灣大學土木工程學研究所學位論文。2013。1-74。