以拍賣賽局理論分析第二價格競標之效益與實證

Second-price bid benefit analysis and empirical experiment by auction game theory

蔡宗翰(Tsung-Han Tsai)

指導教授 ： 荷世平

國立臺灣大學/工學院/土木工程學研究所/碩士(2012年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2012.03035

摘要

台灣公共工程大多採取最低價格競標，然而最低價格競標有許多讓人詬病的問題，希望能夠尋找、研究並驗證是否有更好的投標制度，能提升公共工程的品質，也提升廠商的利益、政府的利益，甚至是公共工程使用者，全民的利益。
諾貝爾經濟學獎得主William Vickery在不完全經濟學領域的貢獻良多，提出維氏拍賣（Second price bid auction）是其重要貢獻之一，本研究希望利用維氏拍賣之概念，發展一具有許多優點的公共工程投標機制。「第二價格同質公共工程競標」即為此招標機制之名稱。第二價格同質公共工程競標之規則為所有廠商參與一次密封（sealed）的投標，由投標價格最低的廠商得標，但得標者可得第二低價作為得標者之工程費用。
本研究使用採用賽局理論（Game theory）分析此規則之效益，並採用實驗設計之研究方法驗證理論之效果。在一定的假設下，透過賽局理論的分析，本研究確認第二價格競標可以使所有參與投標之廠商寫下其保留價格、減少廠商與公務員間的聯誼、勾結等競租行為，並可以確保成本最低廠商得標，使社會效率最高達到柏拉圖效率。而透過實驗設計的實證結果顯示，在此規則下廠商不會立刻依照理論出價，但隨著經驗的增加出價行為逐漸接近理論值。此實驗結果支持理論推導之效果，本制度可供後續研究持續改善並改善現實公共工程之部分問題。

關鍵字

台灣公共工程 ； 最低價格競標 ； 第二價格同質公共工程競標 ； 賽局理論 ； 保留價格 ； 競租行為 ； 柏拉圖效率

並列摘要

Name of Institute：Construction and Engineering Management Program of Department of Civil Engineering, National Taiwan University
Graduate Date：January, 2013 Degree Conferred：Master
Name of Student：Tsung-Han, Tsai Advisor：Shih-Ping Ho, Ph.D.

Most of the Taiwan public constructions use the lowest price bid to determine the contractor. However, the lowest price bid have some criticized issues, This research wants to find, research, and verify a better mechanism for public construction tendering in order to improve the quality of public construction, the interests of the manufacturers or the government's interests, even benefit users of public constructions, improve social interests.

Nobel Prize in economics winner William Vickery, who contribute to incomplete economics proposed Vickers auction. （Second price bid auction） This research hopes to use the Vickers auction concept to develop a tendering mechanism for public constructions, "The second price homogeneity public construction tendering". Second price homogeneity public construction tendering rule is: For all bidders who participate, each could hand in a sealed tender bid. The lowest bidder win the tendering, while the winning bidder gets the second-low bid price as construction project costs.

This research use Game theory to analyze the benefits of this rule, and verify the effect of the theory by experimental design research methods. Under certain assumptions, through the analysis of game theory, this study confirmed that the second price homogeneity public construction tendering can make every participating contractor write down its reserve price, to reduce coordinate, collusion and other rent-seeking behavior between contractors and civil servants. This rule can also ensure the lowest-cost contractor wins the bid. Social welfare will be maximized, and Pareto efficiency will achieve automatically. The empirical results show that through experimental design, every contractor under this rule will not immediately bid according with the theoretical bid, but will gradually close to the theoretical value when bidders gain experience. The experimental results support the theory inference. This rule is available for follow-up research continues to improve and contribute some of the problems solving in the reality world of public constructions.

並列關鍵字

Public Constructions ； Lowest Price Tendering ； Second Price Homogeneity Public Construction Tendering ； Game Theory ； Reserved Price ； Rent-Seeking Activities ； Pareto Efficiency

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