與「敵人」共存：臺灣威權統治晚期的新生份子監控體制

本文主要以高雄地區警察機關監控陳三興、柯旗化等出獄叛亂犯的紙本紀錄為基礎，拼湊臺灣戰後威權統治期間、國民黨政府（簡稱「政府」）企圖與敵人共存的手段和效果。進一步說明，由於無法將明確已知的敵人—叛亂犯徹底消滅，自1950年代初期政府遂將出獄叛亂犯統一編為「新生份子」持續監控；除為提防當事人再犯，政府也期待將當事人打造成順服且富有道德感的理想國民。然對實際負責監控與管教工作的基層警察而言，黨政軍高層的期待從未徹底落實。相反地，政治偵防的特殊性與機關內部層級分化的組織型態，實賦予執法人員游移、反轉垂直階序的彈性；而管教措施本身的缺陷、警察機關龐雜的業務與隨人口持續膨脹的治安壓力，更導致例行的監控及管教任務淪為基層不得不做、但又得不償失的業務黑洞。即至1980年代，作業彈性、講究時效的偵防手段逐步取代例行監控的職能，政府仍難以有效約束當事人的日常動態、或藉機將威脅再次排除。追根究底，充任耳目手足的官僚組織有其運作的邏輯—既能維繫政府機關運作不綴，又容許個別承辦人彰顯動性；最重要地，官僚組織也牽制巨觀體制揭示的政策（治）目標，使警察保衛政權的工作流於形式、重要性日益邊緣。

關鍵字

中國國民黨；威權統治；警察行政；監控；政治犯

並列摘要

By analyzing the archives produced by Kaohsiung City Police Department, this thesis attempts to portray the ideal methods and the actual results of the monitor-reeducate duties carried out by rank and file police officers towards the local post-jail political dissidents, such as Chen San-Hsiang（陳三興）and Ko Chi-Hua（柯旗化）, as part of the overall policies of the KMT Government （hereinafter referred to as “the Government”） to deal with ‘the enemies within’ in Taiwan during the post-WWII authoritarian period from a bottom-up perspective. In light of the fact that the Government could not entirely wipe out ‘the enemies within’, namely, the post-jail dissidents, whom the Government had already identified via formal judicial procedure, all post-jail dissidents were given since the early 1950s a new identity ‘Hsin Sheng Fen Tzu’（or the Reborn）, upon whom the Government imposed constant inspection and strict restriction in case they would rebel again. Meanwhile, through the day-to-day monitor-reeducate routines, the Government also tried to transform these ‘enemies within’ into obedient, conscientious citizens of the ideal type. However, for the local police officials who were the actual executors of the day-to-day monitor-reeducate routines, the policy goal mentioned above was never achieved. In fact, due to the special characteristics of political surveillance and the bureaucratic structure of government apparatus, officials, especially at local levels, were able to retain certain leeway for their own judgement and benefit. Also, combined with the flaws within the SOP of the monitor-reeducate routines and the unreasonable working conditions of the Taiwanese police department after WWII, the daily monitor-reeducate routines, which would occupy considerable time and manpower but with very little effect, had become a headache for local police. As the paradigm of political surveillance shifted in the early 1980s, the daily monitor-reeducate routines on the Reborn were slowly replaced by other more efficient approaches. Throughout the post-WWII authoritarian period, the Government could neither accurately control (or even detect) the everyday activities of the Reborn, nor frame and arrest the dissidents at will. Practically, the bureaucracy operated with its own logic, ensuring its smooth daily function without much actual achievement while at the same time reserving flexibility for individual officials as well. Most important of all, as the Government sought to cage the Reborn in specific areas inside civil society, so as to contain any dissemination of the ‘poisonous thoughts’ harbored by post-jail dissidents, the Government itself was also caged by the bureaucracy within. Thus, from the grassroots level to the top of the police department hierarchy (or perhaps, to the top of the authoritarian regime as a whole）, the entire system, which continued to marginalize and incapacitate the role of political surveillance in practice, had failed at its core policy goal for defending its own political power.