本文綜述了毛澤東至胡錦濤期間(1949年-2014年),中共在黨國一體制度下,政治、社會、經濟之變異脈絡,以及習近平之反貪腐政策及其反貪腐政策的執行與推動成果,試圖回答中國共產黨之反貪腐政策之實踐對中國大陸內部之相關產業(高消費性產業、高價車,博彩業,以及一二線城市房地產)以及總體經濟,歸納出受影響的層面。 本文發現,反貪腐政策對高消費性產業產生成長停滯並下修效果,尤以中國官場上用來送禮、行賄或洗錢的如珠寶、黃金的貴重金屬之業績下滑;高價位車款庫存量提高;頂級紅酒亦復不見往常榮景;而澳門之博奕產業之獲利亦復大幅下修;同時一、二線城市之房地產停止上漲,亦影響及建築相關之周邊產業之慘澹,唯以平民為主要市場的一般價位紅酒、以及一般價位進口車,取而代之成為主流。 此打貪反腐政策貫徹於習近平主席任內頻繁的黨政高官落馬,並由落馬而具體把職位之貪污行為及收賄或獲利的相關數據揭露與新聞媒體,亦是為對網路資訊透明且維權意識高漲之中國社會之無法容許貪污行為的一種具體回應,藉由對貪腐行為的「自清」來尋求中國共產黨繼續執政的合理性,以回復中國共產黨的原始理想與人民站在一起的路線。
This research investages how Xi Jinping's anti-corruptioin policies impact on China's relative industries such as luxuries, limousines, gaming, and properties in metropolis, and macroeconomics. This paper reviews the political, social and economic transformations from Mao Zedong to Hu Jintao's eras, and Xi Jinping's anti-corruption's implementations and results. I found that the anti-corruption policies have significant negative effects on growth of luxuries consumptions, cause sales depression on jewleies, golds and red wines, the decrease of lottery and gaming incomes, and increase the inventory of limousines. I conclude that these anti-corruption's policies not only lead to large numbers of currpted officals be arrested, but the revealing this information known to the public as "self-puring activities"can consolidate the regime legitimacy of CCP in mainland China.