Title

管理當局符合或打敗強制性財務預測的溢酬

Translated Titles

The Rewards to Meeting or Beating Firm's Mandatory Management Forecasts

Authors

何搵財

Key Words

盈餘管理 ; 非預期盈餘 ; 預期管理 ; 強制性財務預測 ; mandatory management forecast ; earning surprise ; expectation management ; earnings management

PublicationName

中原大學會計研究所學位論文

Volume or Term/Year and Month of Publication

2003年

Academic Degree Category

碩士

Advisor

曹壽民;簡俱揚

Content Language

繁體中文

Chinese Abstract

本研究針對財務預測修正、非預期盈餘和預測誤差三者之正負向關係,來探討關於預期管理、盈餘持續性、符合或打敗盈餘預測的盈餘持續性和結合符合或打敗盈餘預測、預期管理及盈餘管理三者關係之研究,並且探討投資人對其是否給予溢酬。 本研究以複迴歸來證實投資人對非預期盈餘,亦即符合或打敗盈餘預測的溢酬,並且在盈餘管理方面,採Modified Jones Model 估計裁決性應計項目,實證 結果如下: 一、在預期管理方面: 本研究實證結果和預期管理假設一致,第一、負向非預期管理之比例較負向預測誤差之比例低,且其差異,隨時間有增加趨勢。第二、在負向預測誤差下,其有正向或零非預期盈餘之比例較零或正向預測誤差其有負向非預期盈餘高,有預期管理存在,且隨時間有增加趨勢。 二、在符合或打敗盈餘預測之溢酬方面: 實證結果顯示在控制預測誤差之下,在預測誤差大小在2.5%增額下,有利的非預期盈餘(•-Up paths)比不利的非預期盈餘的累積異常報酬較高,此差異沒有統計上顯著性。投資人對有打敗盈餘預測公司給予溢酬的幅度是大於無法打敗盈餘預測給予的懲罰,且對符合盈餘預測公司及打敗盈餘預測公司給予之溢酬是不同,此兩個假說均獲得支持且具統計上顯著性。 三、在符合或打敗盈餘預測盈餘持續性方面: 實證結果均支持投資人對實際盈餘為有利潤、上升和財務預測在門檻內之公司給予較高報酬。 四、在符合或打敗盈餘預測的溢酬的持續性方面: 經常打敗盈餘預測公司投資人給予較高報酬。 五、在結合符合或打敗盈餘預測、預期管理和盈餘管理方面: 關於預期管理方面,實證支持有預期管理存在,當投資人知悉管理當局可能對盈餘預測有作預期管理情形時,對於在符合或打敗盈餘預測時,會給予較低報酬,但因沒有統計上顯著性,故沒獲得支持。 關於盈餘管理方面,實證結果指出當投資人得知管理當局有以盈餘管理來符合或打敗盈餘預測時,會給予較低報酬,並且我們以隨機漫步模式計算其結果亦無重大差異。

English Abstract

This study discusses the relationship between earning forecast revisions,earning surprises and forecast errors, in an attempt to explore expectation management, earning persistence, persistence of meeting or beating earning forecast (MBE), and the integration of meeting or beating earning expectation, expectation management and earning management. Moreover, we will explore whether investors regard the above mentioned. This study concludes by multiple regressions that investors reward earning surprise, i.e. meeting or beating firms' management forecast. Modified Jones Model was used to estimate discretionary accrual components. The empirical study concludes that: A. Expectation Management: The empirical results are consistent with the expectation management hypothesis. A) The percentage of negative earning surprises over the entire sample size is lower than the percentage of negative forecast error. In addition, the difference in percentage between negative earning surprises and negative forecast errors increases over time. B) The proportion of firms with positive or zero forecasts that end with negative surprises is smaller than the proportion of firms with negative forecast errors that end with positive surprises, expectation management exists and the trend increases over time. B. Rewards to meeting or beating firms' mandatory management forecast: Empirical study shows that with forecast errors under control, every 2.5% incremental increase of forecast error, CAR associated with a favorable earning surprise is higher than that associated with paths associated with unfavorable earning surprise. This difference is not statistically significant. Investors' reward to firms beating earning forecast is more than investors' penalty for failing to beat earning forecast. Also, the rewards are different for firms meeting earning forecast and firms beating earning forecast. Both hypotheses were supported and statistically significant. C. Earning consistency: Empirical results supports that investors give higher rewards to firms with positive earning, increased earning and not lowering earning forecast. D. Meeting or beating earning forecast: Investors give higher rewards to firms frequently beating earning forecast. E. Integration of meeting of beating earning forecast, expectation management and earning management: A) Expectation management: Empirical evidence supports the existence of expectation management. Investors give lower rewards to firms meeting or beating earning forecast when they are aware of the possibility of firms expectation management to earning forecast. It is not supported due to its statistically insignificance. B) Earning management: Empirical evidence indicates that investors give lower rewards if they are aware that firms meet or beat earning forecast by earning management. Moreover, we calculated using random walk model and obtained results which are not significantly different.

Topic Category 商學院 > 會計研究所
社會科學 > 財金及會計學
Reference
  1. 1.吳安妮,「經理人員自願揭露盈餘預測資訊給外界之決定因素-實證研究」,會計評論,民國八十年:頁1-24
    連結:
  2. 4.林宛潔,「財務預測修正資訊內涵之研究」,國立成功大學會計學研究所碩士論文,民國89年。
    連結:
  3. 5.金成隆、林修葳、張永芳,強制性財務預測誤差與盈餘管理關係:20%門檻限制影響之研究,2000,中國財務學刊,第七卷第一期,頁59-96。
    連結:
  4. 7.徐謝慈,「管理當局盈餘預測品質聲譽、盈餘預測修正與盈餘管理關係之研究」,元智大學管理研究所未出版碩士論文,民91。
    連結:
  5. 12.Bartov, E., Givoly, D., Hayn, C., 2002. The rewards to meeting or beating earnings expectations. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33:
    連結:
  6. 13.Beaver W. H. 1968.The information content of annual earnings announcements.
    連結:
  7. Journal of Accounting Research 6:67-92.
    連結:
  8. 14.Becker, C., M. Defond, and J. Jiambalvo, 1998. The effect of audit quality on earnings
    連結:
  9. properties of accounting income, The Journal of Finance 31:1359-1373.
    連結:
  10. 16.Brooks, L., 2001. A temporal analysis of earnings surprises: profits versus losses.
    連結:
  11. Journal of Accounting Research 39, 221-241.
    連結:
  12. 17.Chevis, G., Das, S. Sivaramakrishnan, K., 2002. Characteristics of firms that
    連結:
  13. persistently meet or exceed analysis earnings forecast. Working paper, Texas A&M
    連結:
  14. manipulations: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC.
    連結:
  15. Contemporary Accounting Research 13, 1-36.
    連結:
  16. 19.Defond, Mark. L., and K. R. Subramanyam, 1998. Auditor changes and discretionary
    連結:
  17. 20.Defond, Mark l., and James Jiambalvo, 1994. Debt covenant violation and
    連結:
  18. 21.Douglas J. Skinner and Richard G. Sloan,1999. Earnings surprises, growth expectations, and stock returns: Don’t let an earnings torpedo sink your portfolio. Working Paper, University of Michigan Business School.
    連結:
  19. 22.Elgers, P.T. and M.H. Lo, 1994. Reduction in analysts? Annual earnings forecast errors using information in prior earnings and security returns, Journal of Accounting Research 32:290-303.
    連結:
  20. 23.Foster G.,1973, Stock-market reaction to estimate of earnings-per-share by company
    連結:
  21. 25.Kasznik,R., McNichols,M., 2002. Does meeting expectations matter? Evidence from analyst forecast revisions and share prices. Journal of Accounting Research 40:727-759.
    連結:
  22. 26.Kormendi, R. and R. Lipe., 1987. Earnings innovations, earnings persistence, and
    連結:
  23. 27.Koji Ota, 2002. The usefulness of Management forecast information. Working Paper,
    連結:
  24. Kansai University Graduate School.
    連結:
  25. Finance 17:155-184.
    連結:
  26. 29.Ohlson, J., 1995. Earnings, book values, and dividends in equity valuation: An
    連結:
  27. 30.Patell, J.M., 1976.Corporate forecasts of earnings per share and stock price behavior:
    連結:
  28. Empirical tests. Journal of Accounting Research 14:703-718.
    連結:
  29. 31.Penman, S. H., 1980. An empirical investigation of the voluntary disclosure of
    連結:
  30. 32.Rangan, Srinivasan, 1998. Earnings management and the performance of seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics 50:101-122.
    連結:
  31. underperformance of seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics
    連結:
  32. 一、中文部份:
  33. 2.宋義德,「管理當局自願性財務預測準確度及資訊內涵之研究」,國立政治大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文,民國85年。
  34. 3.李淑華,「公司規模對異常報酬及盈餘反應係數之影響」,國立台灣大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文,民國81年。
  35. 6.金成隆、林修葳與林憶樺,台灣上市電子公司研究發展費用與強制性盈餘預測關聯性之實證研究,管理學報,第十七卷,第四期,民89,十二月:713-740。
  36. 8.陳子琦, 「強制性財務預測資訊特質與內涵之研究」,國立政治大學會計研究所碩士論文,民國85年。
  37. 9.陳如慧,「經理人員盈餘預測發佈對交易量影響之研究」,國立台灣大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文,民國84 年。
  38. 10.黃煒翔,「企業盈餘預測變動宣告之資訊效果」,國立中興大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文,民國87 年。
  39. 11.蘇勇儒,「管理當局與財務分析師財務預測相對準確性之比較」,東吳大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文,民85。
  40. 二、英文部份:
  41. management, Contemporary Accounting Research, 15:1-24.
  42. 15.Brooks, L.D. and D.A. Buckmaster, 1976. Further evidence of the time series
  43. University.
  44. 18.Dechow, P., Sloan, R., Sweeney, A., 1996. Causes and consequences of earnings
  45. accruals, Journal of Accounting and Economics 25:36-67.
  46. manipulation of accruals, Journal of accounting and Economics 17:145-176.
  47. officials. Journal of Accounting Research:25-37.
  48. 24.Jaggi, B., 1978. A note on the information content of corporate annual earnings
  49. forecast. The Accounting Review 53:961-967.
  50. stock returns. Journal of Business 60:323-346
  51. 28.Lopez, T., Rees, L., 2002. The effect of beating and missing analysts ' forecasts on the
  52. information content of unexpected earnings. Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and
  53. empirical perspective. Contemporary Accounting Research 18 : 107-120.
  54. corporate earnings forecast. Journal of Accounting Research 18:132-160.
  55. 33.Teoh, Siew Hong, Ivol Welch, and T. J.Wong,1998. Earnings management and the
  56. 50:63-99.
Times Cited
  1. 洪小芬(2005)。盈餘及盈餘管理特性對分析師預測之影響。淡江大學會計學系碩士班學位論文。2005。1-74。