Title

公開募集債券、銀行往來關係與獲利能力之實證研究----三階 段最小平方法聯立方程式模型

Translated Titles

Public <a href="http://www.ntsearch.com/search.php?q=Debt&v=56">Debt</a>, Banking Relationship and Profitability in Taiwanese Listed Companies

Authors

林宜賢

Key Words

企業獲利能力 ; 資訊揭露 ; 三階段最小平方法 ; 公開募集債券 ; 銀行往來關係 ; Banking Relationship ; Information Disclosure ; Three Stage Least Square ; Profitability ; Public Debt

PublicationName

中原大學國際貿易研究所學位論文

Volume or Term/Year and Month of Publication

2004年

Academic Degree Category

碩士

Advisor

俞海琴

Content Language

繁體中文

Chinese Abstract

本實證研究利用三階段最小平方法(3SLS)聯立方程式來檢視關於台灣上市公司之企業獲利能力、銀行往來家數以及有關公開募集債券資訊揭露等之間的互動關係探討。由於企業在決定銀行往來家數與揭露訊息的程度上,彼此之間的關係可能是相互獨立的,因此本研究也將企業是否發行公開募集債券納入方程式之中,以便直接地衡量出訊息揭露對企業獲利能力與銀行往來家數的影響。 本研究利用1991年到2000年5,790筆在台灣公開上市之企業進行實證研究後發現,企業獲利能力與銀行往來家數之間顯著地存在一致的負向關係。企業的獲利能力會隨著銀行往來家數的增加而減少,而獲利能力較高的企業將會維持較少的銀行往來家數。 此外,發行公開募集債券的企業群組,無論在多家銀行往來關係、單一銀行往來關係或沒有任何銀行往來關係的情況下,其獲利能力都明顯地比未發行公開募集債券的企業來的低;這隱含將機密資訊揭露給公開募集債券市場的缺點,其影響力遠大於為避免訊息外洩而與銀行維持緊密往來關係的優點。儘管企業發行公開募集債券可享有較低的融資成本,但是該企業也將會發現,對公開募集債券市場揭露訊息者將導致淨預期報酬的降低。 然而,發行公開募集債券的企業比較容易與放款銀行進行協商,因此發行公開募集債券的企業比未發行公開募集債券的企業顯著地容易增加銀行往來家數。尤其是發行公開募集債券的企業發現只有在已是維持多家銀行往來關係的情況下將會較容易與更多的銀行建立往來關係。這意謂著企業只有在維持單一(或沒有任何)銀行往來關係的情況下,企業與銀行往來關係將會非常穩固且緊密而不會受到任何訊息揭露的問題所影響。

English Abstract

In this empirical study, we employ a 3SLS simultaneous equations system to investigate the relationships among the number of banking relationships, information disclosure regarding public <a href="http://www.ntsearch.com/search.php?q=debt&v=56">debt</a> and profitability in regard to a sample of Taiwanese firms. Since the decisions made by the firms regarding the number of <a href="http://www.ntsearch.com/search.php?q=bank&v=56">bank</a> relationships and the extent of information disclosure might be independent of each other, we include the issuance by firms of public <a href="http://www.ntsearch.com/search.php?q=debt&v=56">debt</a> into the equation in order to measure the information disclosed directly. By using a dataset of 5,790 Taiwanese <a href="http://www.ntsearch.com/search.php?q=stock&v=56">stock</a> exchange-listed firms over the 1991-2000 period, our results suggest a significantly negative correspondence between firm profitability and the number of banking relationships. Firms with more banking relationships are less profitable, while profitable firms maintain fewer banking relationships. These results are still economically meaningful and robust after using a three-stage least squares system of equations and including industry dummy variables in the three-stage least squares system of equations. The equations hold under a variety of exogenous variables relating to firm age, size, leverage, the coverage ratio, earnings volatility, the R&D expenditure ratio, the capital expenditure ratio, the fixed assets ratio, the <a href="http://www.ntsearch.com/search.php?q=sales&v=56">sales</a> growth rate and an outstanding dummy variable relating to firms with (or without) public <a href="http://www.ntsearch.com/search.php?q=debt&v=56">debt</a>. Interestingly, firms that issue public <a href="http://www.ntsearch.com/search.php?q=debt&v=56">debt</a> exhibit a significantly lower profitability among all categories of firms with multilateral, bilateral and zero banking relationships, implying that the disadvantages of disclosing confidential information to the public <a href="http://www.ntsearch.com/search.php?q=debt&v=56">debt</a> market weigh more heavily upon firms than the advantages of maintaining close relationships with <a href="http://www.ntsearch.com/search.php?q=banks&v=56">banks</a> in order to avoid information leakage. Firms that disclose information to the public <a href="http://www.ntsearch.com/search.php?q=debt&v=56">debt</a> market find that, although they can keep the cost of their <a href="http://www.ntsearch.com/search.php?q=credit&v=56">credit</a> low, this will result in a lower-than-expected net return. However, firms with public <a href="http://www.ntsearch.com/search.php?q=debt&v=56">debt</a> will find it easier to negotiate with lending <a href="http://www.ntsearch.com/search.php?q=banks&v=56">banks</a> since the number of relationships increases significantly compared to those firms with no public <a href="http://www.ntsearch.com/search.php?q=debt&v=56">debt</a>. In particular, firms that issue public <a href="http://www.ntsearch.com/search.php?q=debt&v=56">debt</a> find it easier to establish more banking relationships only in the case where the firms already maintain multilateral relationships rather than bilateral (or no) relationships. This means that in the case where firms tend to have only a <a href="http://www.ntsearch.com/search.php?q=single&v=56">single</a> banking relationship (or none at all), the relationship will be very solid and close so that it will not be affected by any information disclosure problems.

Topic Category 商學院 > 國際貿易研究所
社會科學 > 經濟學
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Times Cited
  1. 劉毓仁(2006)。銀行關係、承銷商聲譽與經營績效之關係 --台灣上市上櫃公司首次發行新股之研究。中原大學國際貿易研究所學位論文。2006。1-54。