Title

銀行往來關係、監督機制與道德危險之實証研究

Translated Titles

Banking Relationships, Monitoring Mechanisms and Moral Hazards in Taiwanese Listed Companies

Authors

古佳禾

Key Words

Panel Data Model ; 道德危險 ; 銀行往來關係 ; 大股東 ; 監督機制 ; Large Shareholders ; Panel Data Model ; Monitoring Mechanisms ; Moral Hazard ; Banking Relationship

PublicationName

中原大學國際貿易研究所學位論文

Volume or Term/Year and Month of Publication

2004年

Academic Degree Category

碩士

Advisor

俞海琴

Content Language

繁體中文

Chinese Abstract

中文摘要 有鑒於公司治理之重要性,且過去文獻多探討公司績效與公司治理監督機制之關係。本研究則以代理問題為出發,探討公司治理監督機制與管理者之道德危險之關係,根據Yafeh and Yosha (2003) 對管理者道德危險之定義,針對台灣上市公司作一檢驗,以股權與債權之角度探討公司董監事、大股東以及銀行之監督能力;並比較在不同往來銀行關係下股權與債權之監督效果有無差異。另外,針對不同產業環境,比較高科技產業與傳統產業下之董監事、大股東及銀行之對管理者之監督效果是否有差異。研究方法上除利用最小平方法估計外,並針對本研究資料型態為包含橫斷面與縱斷面之Panel Data,故以Panel Data Model控制住公司間存在之差異性並改進最小平方法於估計上之偏誤。 研究發現,董監事持股比例越高會使得管理者道德危險費用支出越低,表示其具有監督效果;而外部大股東則因為資訊不足或蒐集不易下對於管理者之監督能力有限或因為市場流動性高,降低其長期持股之意願進而降低其監督能力。另外,銀行負債比越高確實使得銀行越有誘因監督管理者,且當公司與銀行關係越密切時銀行更能掌握公司訊息,使其對管理者具監督效果並使得大股東降低對公司之資訊不對稱進而提高持股;而當公司與銀行關係不密切下,銀行無誘因監督管理者且使公司在資金籌措上較困難或成本較高,故令董監事與大股東對管理者採取更積極之監督行為。 最後,我們亦發現在傳統產業下董監事、大股東及銀行有顯著監督效果而在高科技業下則否。認為高科技業市場競爭程度對管理者而言乃是另一項監督機制,故降低股權及債權等監督機制之功效;另外,高科技產業在管理者之薪資獎酬制度較傳統產業為佳,使得管理者之利益與公司更趨一致進而舒緩代理問題。

English Abstract

Abstract When it comes to the corporate governance, the previous literatures most investigate the relationship between the performance and the monitoring mechanisms. This study bases on the agency problem to investigate the relationship between the monitoring mechanisms and the moral hazards of managers. According to the definition of moral hazards by Yofeh and Yosha (2003), we use the Taiwanese listed companies to test the monitoring effect of the different monitoring mechanisms between Boards of directors, large shareholders and banks, and to compare the differences monitoring effect of different banking relationship. Besides, we divided the whole listed companies into the high-tech companies and the traditional companies in order to see if the monitoring effect will be different. Owing to the data is panel data, the panel data model is used to be our methodology to control the uniqueness of individual company and to correct the weakness of ordinary least squares in hence to improve the accuracy in estimation. The empirical results show that the higher the boards of directors’ ownerships, the lower the managerial moral hazard expenses. It means that the boards of directors are able to monitor the managers. But for large shareholders, the monitoring effect is limited since the information asymmetry, high market liquidity and low ownerships. The empirical results also show that when the bank debt ratio is high, it makes the banks have more incentives to monitor the managers, and the close banking relationship induces the monitor incentives for banks and large shareholders. In contrast, the non-close banking relationship not only reduces the incentives for banks to monitor the managers but also limits the fund resource for those companies, so it makes the boards and large shareholders become more active to improve the monitor effect. At last, we also find that the effect of monitoring mechanism is obvious in the traditional industry but not in high-tech industry. We explain the differences come from the different market competition and compensation for managers then lower the agency problem.

Topic Category 商學院 > 國際貿易研究所
社會科學 > 經濟學
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