本研究探討董事會結構對自願公告自結損益行為之影響。本研究所探討之董事會結構,分為組織結構及股權結構二個層面。組織結構,包含規模(指董事會規模)、董事涉入執行業務之程度(指董事長是否兼任總經理),以及組成(指內部董事席次比率及獨立董事人數);股權結構,則包含外部董事之持股比率及董事持股質押比率。 實證結果發現,董事之組織結構方面,董事之規模與對自願公告自結損益行為呈現正相關,但未發現有顯著之關係,董事涉入執行業務之程度(即董事長是否兼任總經理) 對自願公告自結損益行為未發現有顯著之關係,董事會之組成(指內部董事席次比率及獨立董事人數) 對自願公告自結損益行為有顯著之關係;董事之股權結構方面,外部董事之持股比率及董事持股質押比率呈現負相關。
This study investigates the impact of Board Structure on the disclosure of self-assessed income before tax. We study six board characteristics that proxy for board independence and the strength of monitoring incentives: (1) board size, (2) CEO/chairman separation, (3) percentage of insider directors, (4) number of independent directors, (5) percentage of shares held by outside directors, and (6) percentage of shares pledged by directors. We find that firms with greater percentage of insider directors, greater percentage of shares pledged by directors, lower percentage of independent directors and CEO/chairman separation are more likely to issue self-assessed income before tax. In addition, these disclosures tend to be more accurate.