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  • 學位論文

公司治理、道德危險及績效之關係-台灣上市公司之實證研究

Corporate Governance、Moral Hazard and Performance Evidence from Taiwanese Listed Companies

指導教授 : 俞海琴博士
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摘要


有關公司治理之研究,早在1930年代即有學者開始探討,而本研究係以代理問題為出發點,探討公司治理、經理人道德危險及公司績效之關係,根據Florackis and Ozkan (2005) 之代理成本變數及Yafeh and Yosha (2003) 對經理人道德危險之定義,針對台灣上市公司作一實驗研究,以股權結構及債權結構的角度探討公司大股東、董監事、經理人持股比例及董事會規模及董事長是否兼任總經理及債權人的監督機制;並比較在不同公司績效下股權結構與債權結構對經理人的道徳危險的監督效果有無差異;另外針對不同產業環境,比較高科技產業及非高科技產業,股權結構及債權結構對經理人之道德危險費用之監督效果有無差異。研究方法除了利用傳統之最小平方法估計外,並針對本研究的資料型態包含橫斷面與縱斷面之Panel Data,故以Panel Data Model控制住公司間存在之差異性並改進最小平方法於估計上之偏誤。 研究發現大股東及董監事持股比例愈高對於現金及短期投資愈有其監督效果;而大股東可能因為資訊不足或蒐集不易的情形下或因市場流動性高,降低其長期投股之意願,對於經理人之道德危險費用多數均呈現無顯著之影響;另多數企業以舉債的方式來投資於研發費用的支出及保有流動性資金之偏好。 以公司績效區分,大股東持股比例愈高對於經理人之道德危險具有其監督效果,但董監事及經理人之則無;而在績效較差的公司中,董事會規模與董事長是否兼任總經理則有明顯的監督效果;而債權人可能是因為資訊不對稱之原因再加上目前企業集資管道眾多,對於經理人之道德危險並無顯著之監督效果。最後,我們亦發現在非高科技產業下,大股東、董監事、經理人及債權人等有較顯著的監督效果,但在高科技產業下則否,認為高科技產業市場競爭程度對經理人而這乃是另一種監督效果之存在,故降低股權及債權等監督機制;另外高科技產業在經理人之薪資獎酬制度下較非高科技產業為佳,使得經理人之利益與公司目標更趨一致進而減少代理問題之產生。

並列摘要


Ever since 1930’s, scholars have begun to study company management. Starting from view of agency, the paper discusses relations between company governance, moral hazard of managers and performance of the company. Based on agency cost variable of Florackis and Ozkan (2005) and definition of manager moral hazard from Yafeh and Yosha (2003), the paper carries out a experimental study on Taiwan listed companies, which discusses topics of holding shares of major stockholder, board and managers, board scale, whether boardsize should also pluralize GM, and monitoring system of debt owner. Meanwhile, the paper discusses whether monitoring system to managers’ moral hazard works differently under different holding share structure and liability structure. In addition, the potential difference is discussed between high- tech industry and traditional industry. Besides Least Squares Approach, Panel Data model is also introduced to control difference between companies Studies show that the more shares major stockholder and board take, the more effectively monitoring on cash and short-term investment works; Wills of major stockholder for long-term investment may be weaken due to lack of information, high mobility of the market, or other factors. However, this kind of weaken wills have no obvious impact on the cost of managers’ moral hazard. In addition, most of the companies prefer to invest in R&D and keep circulating fund by loan. In a company with good performance, the more shares the major stockholder take, the more effectively they monitor managers’ moral hazard, while the board and managers fail to achieve this. But in a company with bad performance, board scale and whether boardsize pluralize GM make a difference in monitoring. Under this condition, debt owners have little influence in monitoring due to insufficiency of information and multiple fund sources. Finally, we notice that in non high-tech industries, major stockholders board, managers and debt owners have strong monitoring. However condition in high-tech industries is different. Fierce competition of the market is a monitoring system in another form, which allows relatively easy monitoring system of stock share and liability right. On the other hand, salaries of managers in high-tech industries are higher than those in traditional industries, which attributes to more common interest between individuals and companies so as to cause less agency issue.

並列關鍵字

ownership debt structure Monitor effect Moral Hazard

參考文獻


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