中國大陸煤炭資源開採制度變遷分析——新制度經濟學之應用

An Institutional Analysis of Coal Mining in China -- An Application of New Institutional Economics

邱雅暄(YA-HSUAN CHIU)

指導教授 ： 蕭代基

國立臺北大學/公共事務學院/自然資源與環境管理研究所/碩士(2016年)

摘要

自1978年中國大陸改革開放以來，總體經濟快速成長，環境保護與社會分配的問題卻逐漸成為國家持續發展的障礙。透過新制度經濟學之命題為框架，本研究探討煤炭資源利用制度的演變過程，探究六十多年間之政策如何變化及為何變化？本研究在路徑依賴與資源詛咒、中國政治組織、礦業經濟史、轉型經濟體的環境治理等的文獻基礎上，發展出對中國耗竭性資源利用制度的理論架構。
本研究顯示，礦產資源永續利用的關鍵在於產權制度和行使之制度環境是否有效。目前在產權安排方面的問題有：礦業產權安排不完整；產權認知的矛盾。在制度變遷方面之問題則有：以地方政府為中心之制度網絡；政治體系內部之交易成本。本研究的意涵是，應該加強執行礦產資源產權與稅費制度、明確礦產產權與相鄰產權的關係、及建立兼具制衡原則與回饋機制的社會體系。

關鍵字

新制度經濟學

並列摘要

As the economic reforms in China began several decades ago, despite the rapid growth of economy, problems in environmental protection and social distribution have become the obstacles toward sustainable development for the country. By applying the analysis framework of new institutional economics, this study explores the institution change of coal mining in China, and raise the questions of how and why these institutions evolve. This study also builds on a collection of literatures from path dependence and resource curse, China’s political system, political economy of transition, to economic history of mining.
It is shown that the key for sustainable utilization of depletable resources is whether the property rights institution and the institution environment which enforce the institution are in effect. In respect of property rights institution, there are problems of undefined or unclear property rights, the inconsistence between the understanding of property rights and the juridical structure, as well as the unclear relation between mineral rights and adjacent rights. Regarding the political units and institutional environment, the absence of state ownership, mixture of property rights and administered rights in local governments, and lack of the mechanism of supervision, sanctions, and feedback are the existing problems.
The implications behind these findings are to enhance the enforcement of property rights and resource taxation, to specify the relation between mineral rights and adjacent rights, and last but not least, to build a society on check-and-balance principle with effective feedback mechanism between agents and the government.

並列關鍵字

New Institutional Economics

參考文獻

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