兩岸空運包機談判之雙層奕局結構分析

Cross-Strait Negotiation on Direct Charter Flight:A Two-Level Game Analysis

廖崇翰(Tsung-Han Liao)

指導教授 ： 吳秀光

國立臺北大學/公共事務學院/公共行政暨政策學系/碩士(2010年)

摘要

2008年，馬英九先生當選總統之後，台灣與中國積極恢復對話。海基會與海協會先後舉辦了四次會談，簽署兩岸之間許多協議。而2008年是一個分水嶺，2008年前與2008年後台灣的內部政治環境相距甚大，從雙層博奕觀點（two-level game）應用於國際談判上，其談判代表與國家內部是否為鐵板一塊（monolithic），是影響談判重要的因素，而台灣在2008年後剛好符合鐵板一塊的特性，這是否是兩岸能夠在短時間內達成許多協議的主要原因？由於空運包機進行談判時間橫跨談判結構改變前後，本研究焦點著重於台灣立法院在兩岸談判的角色，並闡述鐵板一塊前後對談判的影響。以文獻分析與深度訪談法，探討兩岸空運包機的談判過程與立法院的角色定位，並以雙層博奕為基礎，分析實際談判結構的參與者角色，最後探討立法院的結構改變，使的台灣成為鐵板一塊對談判的影響。最後，在研究發現修正雙層博奕運用於兩岸談判的理論檢證，並對談判提出實務與後續研究的建議。

研究結果顯示，兩岸空運包機談判過程中，立法院或立法委員對實際談判沒有任何影響力，台灣鐵板一塊的談判結構並非談判協議達成的主要因素，主要因素在於領導人的政黨屬性，且必須是中國所承認的領導人特質，中國才願意與台灣協商並達成最終協議。而雙層博奕理論運用於兩岸談判時，是不能完全適用的。原因為：

1.內部認可機制-立法院，對兩岸談判沒有直接影響。
2.代表只是代理人，台灣在談判時的雙層博奕現象不明顯。

本研究也發現，現今的談判是兩岸政府藉由兩會（海基會與海協會）所搭起的平台進行直接對話與談判，與2008年之前的複委託談判有所不同。

關鍵字

兩岸包機 ； 雙層博奕 ； 鐵板一塊 ； 談判結構

並列摘要

After Ying-Jeou Ma was elected as the president of Taiwan in 2008, he aggressively began to communicate with the leader of Mainland China. Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) hold the conference four times, and many agreements of China and Taiwan were signed. There are huge differences before and after 2008.Comparing the years before and after 2008, Taiwan’s political environment has changed. Applying two-level game theory to the international negotiation to view that the country’s representatives and the internal are monolithic or not. And monolithic is a key factor to negotiate. Taiwan just fit the condition of monolith after 2008. Hence, according to the previous reasoning, is it the main reason that Taiwan and China reached many agreements in the short time? Because the negotiation of direct charter flight happened during the internal political environment changed before and after, this research focused on what the role Legislative-Yuan plays in cross-strait negotiation. The research is based on document analysis and in-depth interview to discuss the process of negotiation and the role of Legislative-Yuan play. Meanwhile to analysis the negotiation structure within two-level game theory, then fix the theory for observation to the cross-strait relationship. Furthermore, give some recommendations to the policy and further research.

According to the findings, the members of Legislative-Yuan don’t have any affection on the cross-strait negotiation during the process. And ”monolith” Taiwan is not the key reason for the negotiation. The key point is the leader’s party ideology, and his or her personal characteristics must be approved by China. And China will negotiate with Taiwan and reach agreements. The two-level game theory didn’t fit the observation of cross-strait negotiation. The reasons are below:

1. Legislative-Yuan doesn’t affect the cross-strait negotiation process
2. Representatives are just agents. The situation in two-level game is not outstanding.

Besides, the research also found that the roles of SEF and ARATS have become the negotiation channel between Taiwan and China.

並列關鍵字

direct charter flight within cross-strait ； two-level game ； monolithic ； negotiation structure

參考文獻

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