我國中央政府體制為總統制抑或雙首長制,雖有爭議,但依現行憲法之規定,立法院對於總統及行政院院長分別有彈劾及不信任投票之權限。我國地方自治團體亦設有地方行政機關及地方立法機關,但依地方制度法相關規範,地方議會並無類似立法院對於行政首長之解職權限,且依地方制度法第84條之規定,監察院對於地方行政首長有彈劾權限,因此地方議會雖與立法院均為民意機關,但在對於行政首長之制衡機制上,則有中央與地方不同制度設計之問題。 由於涉及我國監察院之彈劾權限,因此將透過對於我國監察權理論及變革之探討、垂直分權下中央對地方自治團體之監督與限制,以及水平分權下地方自治團體內立法機關對行政首長之制衡制度之探討,藉以檢討分析我國現行對於地方行政首長彈劾制度之不合理,並提出制度上之建議。
It remains controversial that if the system of our central government is a presidential system or a two-head one. According to our Constitution, however, the Legislative Yuan retains the right to impeach the President and vice President and also the right of vote of no confidence over the Premier. Based on the self-governing laws, there we have both local administration and local legislative institutions, but the local councils, unlike the Legislative Yuan, do not have the power to propose the dismissal of local administers. Furthermore, according to the Article 84 of Local Government Act, the right to impeach the local administers belongs to the Control Yuan. That is, though the local councils and the Legislative Yuan are both elected institutions, their rights over head officials concerning checks and balances reveal the differences between the central and the local systems. Due to the rights of the Control Yuan involved, the analysis of unreasonable aspects of the impeachment system for local administers, therefore, is to be carried out through an examination of the theory and change of powers of control, the supervision and limitation of central self-governing body over local ones in the form of vertical separation of powers, and the system of checks and balances of the legislative institution within local self-governing body over the local administers in the form of horizontal separation of powers.