透過您的圖書館登入
IP:18.222.163.31
  • 學位論文

所有權結構、多角化與公司現金持有價值之研究—中國上市公司之實證

指導教授 : 洪榮華 林翠蓉
若您是本文的作者,可授權文章由華藝線上圖書館中協助推廣。

摘要


本文主要探討在不同所有權結構下,多角化與公司現金持有價值之間的關係,並依據股權分置改革前後、內部資本市場與代理理論,發展四個假說。研究樣本以中國大陸2003年至2009年間,上海證券交易所上市之企業為樣本,共3903個觀察值進行實證分析。實證結果發現,不論是國有企業或是境內法人企業,多角化均會降低現金持有價值,且現金價值皆小於一,支持多角化是由代理問題所驅動的論述;然而在股權分置改革後,不論所有權結構,多角化公司現金持有價值皆呈現顯著上升,顯示,股權分置改革,提升了公司運作的透明度與市場的監督力量,降低了代理問題,使得公司現金使用效率比股改前高。

並列摘要


This paper examines the relationship between diversification and the value of corporate cash holdings in different ownership structure and the impact of Split Share Structure Reform on this relationship. We develop four hypotheses based on internal capital market and agency problems. The sample contains the listed firms in Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2009 and we obtain 3903 firm-year observations. We find that diversification lower the value of cash. No matter firms are owned by state or legal person, the value of cash holdings is lower than 1. These findings support that diversification is driven by agency problems. After Split Share Structure Reform, the value of cash holdings is significant higher than before. This finding shows that Split Share Structure Reform lowers the negative impact of agency problems.

參考文獻


楊朝旭,「集團多角化對研發外溢調節效果之研究」,會計評論,第46期,
Jahera, J. Jr., P. L. William and E. P. Daniel, “Firm Diversification
Agrawal, A., J. F. Jeffe and G. N. Mandelker, “The Post-merger Performance of Acquiring Firms: a Re-Examination of an Anomaly”, The Journal of Finance., 47, pp. 1605-1621, 1992.
Bortolotti, B. and A. Beltratti, “The Nontradable Share Reform in the Chinese Stock Market”, Working Paper, 2006.
Boubakri, N., J. C. Cosset and O. Guedhami, “Postprivatization Corporate Governance: The Role of Ownership Structure and Investor Protection”, Journal of Financial Economics., 76, pp. 369-399, 2005.

被引用紀錄


邱照瑋(2013)。公司治理、高管薪酬與公司績效之研究:以中國上市金融業為例〔碩士論文,國立臺北大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://www.airitilibrary.com/Article/Detail?DocID=U0023-2506201313121000

延伸閱讀