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  • 學位論文

公司實質控制者法制之建構—以影子董事與控制股東責任法制之比較分析為中心

Reconstruction of the Controlling Person Behind the Curtain: Focused on Comparative Analysis Between Shadow Directors and Controlling Shareholders

指導教授 : 王志誠
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摘要


我國公司法在2012年1月4日修法前,董事係採取形式認定之標準,必須具備法定職稱且經法定程序選任者,方為公司法第8條之當然負責人。又,公司法上並未直接規範自然人控制股東,而僅於關係企業專章中對控制公司之責任設有規定,但由於其責任主體限於公司組織,而不及於非公司組織之自然人,形成法律規範上之漏洞。亦即,修法前僅就法律上董事之責任定有明文,而對於事實上董事及影子董事之法律責任,則欠缺相關規範,造成實務上存在非董事而享有與董事相同之經營實權之人,或者控制股東不願由其本身當選為董事,卻由受其指揮操縱之人頭當選為董事,迂迴達到參與公司運作的目的,甚至藉此掏空公司牟取私利。此等公司之實質控制者逸脫於董事責任之約束,造成有權無責之情形,無疑是我國公司治理上嚴重之規範缺口。 所幸,修法後增訂公司法第8條第3項:「公開發行股票之公司之非董事,而實質上執行董事業務或實質控制公司之人事、財務或業務經營而實質指揮董事執行業務者,與本法董事同負民事、刑事及行政罰之責任。但政府為發展經濟、促進社會安定或其他增進公共利益等情形,對政府指派之董事所為之指揮,不適用之。」除了正式引進實質董事之規範外,並因此而架構起控制股東對公司之受託義務,將有助於我國公司法制之健全發展。但該條文除了有不足及未臻明確之處,更會與我國關係企業專章之部分規定發生齟齬,產生適用上之疑慮。因此,本文以「英國法實質董事」與「美國法控制股東」之法理,作為外國立法例之研究對象,輔以英美法重要司法實務判決之發展,期許能對我國法律規範有所啟發。 筆者希冀能重新建構公司法第8條第3項,使其成為我國公司法實質董事及控制股東責任之有效規範途徑。同時,就控制股東之關係人交易及其持有多數股權而濫用多數決原理之行為加強監控機制,並再檢視我國關係企業專章之條文,確實有效移植揭穿公司面紗原則或法人格否認法理於條文中。最後,亦希望藉由本文粗淺之探討與建議,達成拋磚引玉之效,使我國公司實質控制者之法制建構更加蓬勃。

並列摘要


The standard to determine whether someone is a director or not was called the Standard of Formality as elaborated under the Company Act of Taiwan (the “Company Act”) before amended on January 4, 2012. In other words, pursuant to the Company Act before amended on January 4, 2012, only the one who is appointed to be responsible for specific position(s) would be considered as a responsible person under Article 8 of the Company Act. Besides, the responsibilities of natural person controlling shareholders were not provided by the Company Act before amended on January 4, 2012, which means the responsibilities of the so-called “de facto directors” and “shadow directors” were not specifically regulated. As a result, such directors were actually in charge of corporate management without taking any legal responsibilities. Worst of all, it might even lead to the depletion of a company’s assets. Therefore, there are legal loopholes regarding corporate governance need to be supplemented. As mentioned above, the Company Act was amended on January 4, 2012. Paragraph 3, Article 8 of the newly amended Company Act T provides that: “For a company whose shares have been issued in public, a non-director who de facto conducts business of a director or de facto controls over the management of the personnel, financial or business operation of the company and de facto instructs a director to conduct business shall be liable for the civil, criminal and administrative liabilities as a director in this Act, provided, however, that such liabilities shall not apply to an instruction of the government to the director appointed by the government for the purposes of economic development, promotion of social stability, or other circumstances which can promote public interests.”The amended Company Act not only officially provides the regulations for the responsibilities of de facto directors and shadow directors, but also firmly establishes controlling shareholders’ fiduciary duties toward company. The amended Company Act is expected to improve the legal regime for the companies of Taiwan. However, there are still some issues remained unsolved after the amendment of the Company Act. For example, some terms used in the amendment are not clear enough to prevent the controversy about their interpretations. Moreover, in some respects, they contradict some provisions under Chapter VI-I of the Company Act which regulate Affiliated Enterprises to some degree. Consequently, this study tries to clarify these issues from the aspect of comparative law by comparing the legal principle of “de facto directors” and “shadow directors” of the United Kingdom and the “controlling shareholders” of the United States with the Company Act. In addition, the court verdicts of foreign countries are also discussed in this study to clarify such issues. All in all, this study tries to polish Paragraph 3, Article 8 of the Company Act to make it the major regulating mechanism for the responsibilities of de facto directors, shadow directors and controlling shareholders. Also, this study tries to incorporate the regulations on related party transactions of controlling shareholders and abuse of majority decision into the Company Act. Furthermore, this study would examine whether the principles of ”Piercing the Corporate Veil” and “Disregard of corporate personality” are thoroughly put into practice or not in the Chapter of Affiliated Enterprises of the Company Act. Last but not least, this study tries to inspire some thinking with regard to the development of the Company Act.

參考文獻


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被引用紀錄


王美玲(2015)。金控法規範的利害關係人非授信交易之探討〔碩士論文,國立中央大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://www.airitilibrary.com/Article/Detail?DocID=U0031-0412201512045484
莊喬勝(2015)。股東於股東會行使股東權之範圍與界限〔碩士論文,國立中正大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://www.airitilibrary.com/Article/Detail?DocID=U0033-2110201614042764

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