台灣的自然資源在中央科學管理與傳統地方自治下,呈現嚴重的代理問題與逐利問題。代理問題的產生乃由於代理人所考量的私人利益迥異於主人(所有的居民)利益,致使代理人不顧及主人的利益而聽從利益團體的逐利要求。針對這個問題,本文認為根本解決之道在於讓主人有誘因與能力去監督考核與獎懲代理人,使代理人的利益與主人的利益一致,才能促使代理人努力執行管理工作,符合主人的利益。 本文提出一個創新的自然資源管理制度,創新之處是建立以單一自然資源(如流域)管理為其唯一任務的地方自治團體,其基本原則包括:(1)單一資源管理,以各自然資源之分佈區域為管理轄區,(2)由權益相關者(stakeholders)組成該轄區之地方自治團體,(3)權益相關者參與的原則為「貢獻與權利相符原則」(principle of interest-participation)。
Due to the tradition of scientific management and governing various public affairs within one political district, serious principal-agent problems and rent-seeking phenomena have occurred in natural resource management in Taiwan. Usually, the public managers of natural resources, the agents, do not work mainly for the interests of their principals, the people. In order to solve this problem, we propose a new institution of natural resource management that provides principals with strong incentives and capacity to supervise their agents. The supervision would in turn provide agents with incentives to work for the best interests of their principals. This institution is governed by the stakeholders of the natural resource with participatory management. It follows three principles: (1) The management district of the natural resource is its distribution area. (2) The self-governance body of the natural resource is organized by all of stakeholders in this natural resource district. (3) The participation of a stakeholder follows the Principle of Contribution and Participation.
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