我國刑法第153條之規定是「煽惑他人犯罪或違背法令罪」,關於此一規定的處罰基礎其實並不明確,因為一方面煽惑行為的作用是指向其所煽惑之罪所欲保護的法益,另一方面,由於本罪處於刑法分則妨害秩序罪章之中,也不能切斷其與名為公共秩序之集體法益的關聯。那麼本罪所保護的法益究竟為何?本文認為,不管將本罪視為一種特殊的參與型態,還是當做保護所有犯罪規定涉及法益的抽象危險犯,都欠缺類型化的實質依據。而所謂公共秩序法益,其內涵也和刑法或其他法令的整體規範功能重複。因此,本文提出「規範效力之可信賴性」的破壞作為本罪的處罰理由。在此一觀點之下,現行規定中的煽惑概念顯然牽連過廣,因而有根據規範目的限縮解釋的必要。
Article 153 of Criminal Code provides the offense ”inciting people to commit crimes or to infringe laws and orders”. However, the bases for criminalizing such acts remain vague. On one hand, the effect of the inciting acts directs to the legal good secured by the norm, which is incited to breach. On the other hand, the offense is listed in chapter ”order disturbance” of the special part of the Criminal Code. Therefore, the context shows that the offense also involves the collective legal good, in the name of ”public order”. Which one is the legal good deemed to be protected eventually? The author supposes neither of them could be considered as the legal good at issue. One could not set substantial bases for typifying the acts by asserting that inciting is a special mode of accessory. Nor could he take inciting as an abstract potential damages offence against all the legal goods provided in Criminal Code. Furthermore, the meaning of the legal good concerned, the so called ”public order”, overlaps the overall normative function of the Criminal Code. The author thus presumes ”sabotage of the reliability of the norm validity” as the substantial bases for criminalization. Under such understanding, the scope of ”inciting” in the current provision is obviously too broad. Accordingly, it's necessary to interpret the term strictly basing upon the purpose of the norm.
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