台灣區段徵收制度之政經分析

The Political Economy of the Zone Expropriation in Taiwan

李素蘭(Su-Lan Lee)

指導教授 ： 蕭全政

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/政治學研究所/碩士(2010年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2010.00164

摘要

制度作為人類社會生存、發展過程中分配與利用資源的方式，必然隱含特定的政治與經濟特性；制度隱含政經特性的根本原因，是因為其都隱含著特定的「偏差」（bias）。區段徵收是近年來頗受政府青睞的土地開發方式，區段徵收後的土地處理方式，涉及開發利益之分配。所以本文以制度之政經分析的理論觀點，從台灣戰後的政經發展脈絡，梳理台灣區段徵收制度的形成、運作與變遷。
台灣的區段徵收制度，從威權體制下形成之「漲價歸公的區段徵收」；隨著威權轉型演進為地主與政府合作開發的「抵價地式區段徵收」；乃至政治民主化後，再轉型為地主、政府與開發商合作開發之「公私協力之區段徵收」，各時期制度隱含的偏差，涉及主要行為者的利害得失關係。顯示，台灣區段徵收制度的發展緊扣著台灣的政經脈動。
由於抵價地式區段徵收是地主與政府合作之開發模式，政府對於抵價地比例之決定應本合作開發之精神；並應秉持不追求盈利之原則，強化現行區段徵收制度之土地儲備功能；又區段徵收仍屬徵收之一環，政府於施行決策時應回顧公共利益之必要性。另外，在政府受限於職能及財政的情況下，引進民間資源辦理區段徵收開發作業，應審慎評估其必要性，必要採行時，華中橋BT模式尚為可行，惟應降低土地壟斷之問題；同時認為政府應正視整體開發（區段徵收）區之問題；並進而就區段徵收與市地重劃開發方式予以整合，以衡平二種開發方式地主間之權益。

關鍵字

區段徵收 ； 偏差 ； 抵價地 ； 抵價地比例 ； 公私協力

並列摘要

As an approach for maintenance, development, and distribution of resources in human society, every system implies its specific political and economic differentiations. The fundamental reason for these implicit traits attributes to the implication of specific “bias.” In the recent years, the zone expropriation is the most popular way for the government in exploiting lands. The management of the land after the zone expropriation concerns with the distribution of the profits. Therefore, this essay applies the perspectives of the theoretical analysis of politics and economy of the system to explicitly illustrate the formation, the operation and the transition of the zone expropriation in Taiwan.
In Taiwan, the operation of the zone expropriation transformed several times with the development of politics. First, the zone expropriation system formed the confiscated frame when there was a mark-up under the authoritarian regime. Continually, with the shift from the authoritarian regime to the stage where the cooperation of the landlords and government were involved, the system turned into the “pay-for-land” zone expropriation. Afterwards, in the democracy phase, the “public-private partnership” is applied in zone expropriation that the land holders, the government, and the exploiters were involved. The gains and losses of the executor are involved in the implicit deviation between systems in the different periods. Accordingly, the transition revealed that the development of the zone expropriation system and the vibration of the politics and economy were highly related.
Owing to the cooperation of the landlords and the government in the “ pay-for-land” zone expropriation, the government should take a collaborative attitude toward the distribution of the ratio of pay-for-land. Moreover, the government should not aim to pursue the interest, but reinforce the function of the reservations on contemporary zone expropriation system. Since the zone expropriation is one form of the expropriation, the government should take public benefit into consideration when making policy. In addition, due to the limited function and finance conditions, the government should carefully evaluate the necessity of exploiting the zone expropriation when the governors inevitably use the non-governmental resources. For instance, the PPP mode which was carried out in the construction of Hua-Zhong Bridge BT was feasible when the monopolistic problem could be diminished. All in all, to weigh the benefit of land holders, government should face the problem of land comprehensive development (zone expropriation) and should integrate the zone expropriation system with urban land consolidation.

並列關鍵字

Zone Expropriation ； Bias ； Pay-for-land ； Ratio of Pay-for-land ； Public-private Partnership

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