兩岸締結協議監督機制之研究～第九屆立法院六個提案版本的比較分析

Study on Cross-Strait Agreement Supervisory Mechanism: A Comparative Analysis of Six Draft Proposal in Taiwan’s Ninth Legislative Yuan

楊喜慧(Shi-Huei Yang)

指導教授 ： 陳明通

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/國家發展研究所/博士(2017年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201701304

摘要

本論文探討建立兩岸締結協議監督機制的法理基礎。研究目的在探討兩岸締結協議監督機制如何達到有效監督？如何達到權力分立的衡平性？兩岸協商監督機制是否有監督高政治議題談判的制度設計？
筆者首先將我國中央政府體制定位為總統制，站在總統制的基礎上，行政與立法就是一種權力分立的關係，而不是內閣制行政與立法合一的「國會主治」。權力分立與制衡理論最主要是為了防止專權腐化，但是權力分立理論不應只是為了避免專權暴政，尚有追求效率，因為在不同的政府部門間進行分工，可提高政府效率。不同部門行使「共享權力的原則」就顯得非常重要，如此才能在權力分立與制衡理論下，仍保有整個中央政府的運作效率。
在權力分立但共享以提升兩岸締結協議效率的理念下，本論文試從談判時程及監督密度兩個面向，建立整個比較架構。就談判的時程而言，兩岸協商簽署協議的監督機制，可分為談判前、談判中、談判後三個階段；就監督的密度而言，高、中、低三種類型。比較目前在立法院審議包括時代力量等六個版本的兩岸締結協議監督條例法案後，發現這些版本中有些規範是符合法理且現實可行，有些則否，因此在綜合各家版本後，本論文進一步提出比較可行的建議版本。

關鍵字

兩岸人民關係條例 ； 兩岸協議 ； 監督機制 ； 權力分立 ； 權力共享

並列摘要

This study shed light on the legal principle of Cross-Strait Agreement Supervisory Mechanism. The aims of the study are to discuss how to efficiently oversight Cross-Strait Agreement Supervisory Mechanism, how to reach its check and balance in separation of power, and to design a system to supervised the high political issues, which might change the international situation of Taiwan.

The researcher consider the government of Taiwan as a presidential system not a parliamentary system, the former is a separation of power for both executive and legislative, and the latter is the unity of executive and legislative. The main purpose for separation of power and theory of check and balance is to avoid power collapse. However, the separation of power theory is not only for the purpose of avoiding authoritarian tyranny, but also seeking for the executive efficiency. Cooperation among separated branches within government would increase the government efficiency. In this case, the principle of separated branches exercising shared powers seems to be very important, for that the exercise of the entire Taiwan government could remain efficient under the footing of separation of power and check and balance power.

In order to increase the efficiency of Cross-Strait Agreement under the separation of power to reaching a stage where powers are shared, this study focus on two aspects to established a comparison framework, which are timing of negotiation and oversight density. For timing of negotiation, Cross-Strait Agreement Supervisory Mechanism can be divided into three stages, which is before-negotiation, between-negotiation, and after-negotiation. For oversight density on the other hand is divided into high, medium, and low. After comparing the 6 versions of Cross-Strait Agreement Supervisory Mechanism, the researcher found that some of the regulations in these 6 versions are considered to be legally practicable, but some are not. Hence, the purpose of this study is to further comparing and integrating these 6 versions to come up with a better version of Cross-Strait Agreement Supervisory Mechanism.

並列關鍵字

Act Governing Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area ； Cross-strait agreements ； Oversight Mechanisms ； Separation of Powers ； Power-sharing

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