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  • 學位論文

調節焦點與企業避稅

Regulatory Focus and Effective Tax Rates

指導教授 : 許文馨
共同指導教授 : 劉心才(Sophia H. T. Liu)
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摘要


過去研究發現,企業經理人的個人特質對於企業避稅行為之有無、避稅金額之大小皆有顯著影響。同時依據心理學的調節焦點理論(Regulatory Focus Theory),具有促進型目標定向(Promotion Focus)者有追求高額績效及報酬之傾向;反之具有預防型目標定向(Prevention Focus)者則較為謹慎,為了避免風險願意放棄追求額外報酬。以上述兩種理論為基礎,本文的研究目的為探討具有促進型目標定向之經理人,在企業避稅行為上是否與具有預防型目標定向之經理人間存在顯著之差異。本文使用經理人的目標定向為自變數,並以企業避稅程度為依變數(分別使用實際稅率、財稅差異等多種變數衡量)。本研究發現具有促進型目標定向之經理人在從事企業避稅的意願和金額上都顯著高於具預防型目標定向之經理人,顯示具促進型目標定向之經理人相較於具預防型目標定向之經理人更願意為了追求高額報酬而承擔額外的風險。但本研究並未發現具預防型目標定向之經理人與企業稅捐負擔成正向關係。

並列摘要


This study investigates whether CEO personality can influence corporate tax avoidance. According to regulatory focus theory, people with a “promotion focus” are more eager to reach higher performance and benefits, whereas people with a “prevention focus” are more willing to give up additional benefits to avoid the associated risks. The purpose of this study is to find out whether a strongly promotion-focused CEO would act significantly differently from a strongly prevention-focused CEO in avoiding tax. Using use CEO regulatory focus as independent variables, and use measures of corporate tax avoidance (such as effective tax rate and book tax difference) as dependent variables, I find promotion-focused CEOs are significantly more aggressive in avoiding taxes, compared with prevention-focused CEOs. This result indicates that strongly promotion-focused CEOs are more willing to maximize their financial performance, even with the costs of additional risks. But I do not find significant positive relation between strongly prevention-focused CEOs and corporate tax burden as I expected.

參考文獻


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Armstrong, C. S., Blouin, J. L., & Larcker, D. F. (2012). The incentives for tax planning. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 53, 391-411.
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Balakrishnan, K., Blouin, J. L., & Guay, W. R. (2012). Does Tax Aggressiveness Reduce Corporate Transparency? Available at SSRN 1792783.

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