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  • 學位論文

誰為環境發聲?環境財損害賠償的模式選擇

Who Will Be Nature’s Attorney? Approaches Toward Full Recovery of Environmental Damage

指導教授 : 葉俊榮
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摘要


在環境破壞或污染事件中,撇開可能的行政罰、刑罰責任不談,污染者應如何為其行為負起「真正的責任」?如果污染者侵害了私人的人格權或財產權,污染者基於侵權行為法或公害法,必須負擔民事上的損害賠償責任,回復損害發生前的原狀,或在無法回復原狀時以金錢賠償。這些受害的人身及財產,在法律上權利歸屬明確,權利人自然會為他�她們受害的權利請求救濟,不愁無人發聲。然而,同樣因污染而受害的生態環境與自然資源等「環境財」(environmental goods),由於並不屬於任何人,在法律上可能沒人有資格替它發聲。結果是,污染者不必賠償環境財的損害。在這樣的情形下,污染者並未真正為其污染行為負起完全的責任。 本文主張污染者應對環境財的損害負起完全的賠償責任。因此,本文要回答幾個核心問題:首先,為何污染者應對環境財的損害負賠償責任,即令環境財在法律上並不屬於任何人?其次,有哪些對待環境財的模式,有助於落實環境財的損害賠償?第三,臺灣目前採取了哪個模式?下一步又可往哪個模式發展?第四,環境責任的下一步,應如何具體實踐與運作? 本文首先主張,外部成本的內部化及代際正義,是污染者應對環境財損害負賠償責任的主要理由。其次,本文整理爬梳歷來的法學論述及人類社會的具體實踐,歸納出四種對待環境財的模式,有助於解決環境財損害賠償的問題。這四種模式分別是:(1)環境人格化模式;(2)環境私有化模式;(3)環境權主張模式;(4)信託模式。本文認為,進入大量環境立法的時代以來,信託模式已是主流的模式,但在臺灣的實踐仍有許多缺陷,污染者不必對環境財損害負賠償責任的問題並未獲得解決。在比較各種模式的優勢與劣勢之後,對於環境責任的下一步,本文選擇以環境權主張模式來彌補信託模式的不足。 關於環境權主張模式的具體運作,本文認為:立法者所制定的環境法規劃定的「環境優勢」,正可作為「環境權」的內涵。當污染者違反環境法規,它也侵犯了人們享有美好、健康的生態環境以及「生態服務」(ecosystem services)的權利,應負損害賠償責任。生態環境、自然資源及其對人類所提供的生態服務,現實上為不特定多數人共同享有且難以排他,基於此一特性,不妨認為「環境權人」就是全體人民(甚至可以包含未來世代)。但出於訴訟經濟及代表性的考量,應由環保團體代表全體環境權人向污染者請求損害賠償;亦即,環保團體有當事人適格。原告環保團體得請求污染者整治污染、復育生態,回復損害發生前的原狀,或請求回復原狀的費用,以代回復原狀;若不能回復原狀,得請求污染者以金錢賠償環境財的損失。環境財雖然往往因為不在市場上被交易而不具有明確的價格,但為環境財損害酌定適當的賠償金,是法院應該做、也可以做到的事。然而,基於環境財的利益為不特定多數人共同享有且難以排他的特性,環保團體請求所得的賠償金不應再分配給個人,而應專款專用於污染整治、復育生態、回復環境財損害及其他與環境保護、永續發展相關的事項。為此,我們可以用賠償金成立一筆「環境財基金」,為基金建立永續管理的機制,而未來所有的環境財損害賠償都注入此筆環境財基金,如此一來更可以照顧到未來世代的環境利益。這樣的環境權主張模式及具體運作,都能在現行法律上找到基礎,並非翻天覆地的創新,而只是在當今的法律典範上前進小小的一步。

並列摘要


Besides civil and/or criminal penalties prescribed by environmental statutes, what kind of environmental liability should be imposed on the polluter in cases of environmental destruction or pollution? Needless to say, under tort law and nuisance law, if the pollution constitutes a tort against a person or private property, the polluter as a tortfeasor must pay a sum of damages in order to compensate for the injuries suffered by the victims. Obviously, the polluter bears the tort liability because personal rights and property rights have been so clearly defined that the court faces no difficulty recognizing right-holders’ standing to sue the polluter for compensation. However, what about those “environmental goods” to which no one has a clear legal title, but are also damaged by pollution? Who has standing to sue the polluter for recovery of the damage to environmental goods? Shall the polluter be excused from civil liability, merely because environmental goods belong to no one (and, as a result, no one has standing to sue)? Should it be the case, it cannot be said that the polluter is fully responsible for all the loss and damage caused by pollution. The core argument of this thesis is that the polluter shall bear full civil liability for the damage he causes to environmental goods. This thesis attempts to address four main questions: Firstly, why should the polluter compensate for the damage to environmental goods, even if no one has legal title to those environmental goods? Secondly, what approaches to the distribution and management of environmental goods can realize full recovery of environmental damage? Thirdly, which approach(es) does Taiwan adopt, and which approach(es) should be the next stage for Taiwan? Fourthly, what should be the specifics and details of the environmental liability scheme of the next stage? How should it be practiced and operated? Part 2 of this thesis defines “environmental goods” as natural objects, natural resources and their functions – ecosystem services – to which no one has legal title. Part 2 also argues that internalization of external costs and intergenerational equity are two main reasons why it is desirable and necessary to have the polluter make full recovery of damage to environmental goods; both reasons have their legal basis in the Basic Environment Act of Taiwan. Based on existing legal and economic theories and human practices, Part 3 proposes four approaches to the distribution and management of environmental goods that theoretically may help to achieve full recovery of environmental damage. These approaches are: (1) Rights of Nature approach, (2) Privatization of Environmental Goods approach, (3) Right to Environment approach, and (4) Public Trust of Environmental Goods approach. Since the era of environmental legislation and regulation, Public Trust of Environmental Goods approach has become the mainstream and has been widely adopted by countries including Taiwan. However, in Taiwan, Public Trust of Environmental Goods approach has not been practiced perfectly and flawlessly; there still remain some loopholes in Taiwan’s statutory environmental liability regime so that polluters do not always have to pay civil compensation for environmental damage to the trustee of environmental goods – the Government. In order to close these loopholes, after a comparison of four approaches and a brief analysis of their pros and cons, I suggest that Right to Environment approach can complement the mainstream Public Trust of Environmental Goods approach and should be Taiwan’s next (but not final) step toward a full-recovery environmental liability regime. Part 4 goes into the specifics and details of how Right to Environment approach can be practiced and operated. Some critical questions are addressed. Firstly, what should be the content of “right to environment,” if it is to be a meaningful and operable substantive legal right? I argue that the right to environment is a right defined by various environmental legislation and regulations, with an aim to protect people’s interests in the enjoyment of a healthy environment and ecosystem services it provides. When the polluter fails to comply with certain environmental statutes or regulations, such as environmental standards and prohibition of some particular activities, he also commits a tort against people’s right to environment and, as a result, should bear the compensatory liability. Secondly, who is/are the holder(s) of the right to environment? My answer to this is: all the people, including future generations to come! It is because a healthy environment and ecosystem services it provides are what people as a group have, enjoy, and share in common. To be concise, most environmental goods have strong externality and are by nature non-excludable; most of the time, it is costly or even impossible to tell “who” individually enjoys “how much” of “what benefit” from a given environmental good. Thirdly, who has/have standing to sue the polluter for compensation? In light of efficiency of the proceedings, adequate representation, and the logic of collective action, I suggest that only environmental NGOs may have standing and thus can be the plaintiff(s) – on behalf of and for the benefit of all the people as victims whose right to environment was infringed by pollution. Fourthly, with respect to plaintiff’s remedies, the environmental NGO should be entitled to demand that the polluter carry out the removal and remedy of the pollution, rehabilitation of damaged natural environment, and/or restoration of ecosystem’s functions; or to demand that the polluter pay the costs thereof. But in cases where those measures are impossible or infeasible, the polluter should pay monetary damages instead for the loss of environmental goods. Even though many environmental goods are usually not commodities traded in the market and thus may not have their “prices,” the court should nevertheless assess the “value” of those damaged environmental goods when determining the appropriate amount of monetary damages. Lastly, if the plaintiff environmental NGO wins the lawsuit and damages are awarded, how should the monetary awards be allocated and used? I suggest that, instead of distributing the money, an “Environmental Goods Fund” can be established with those monetary awards. The money from the Fund should be appropriated exclusively for the purposes of removal and remedy of pollutions, rehabilitation of damaged natural environment, restoration of ecosystem’s functions, and other purposes related to environmental protection and sustainable development. My suggestion is based not only on the fact that most environmental goods have strong externality and are shared in common by the general public, but also on the need of achieving intergenerational equity. Using the monetary compensation in this way, the environmental interests of the general public and even of future generations can be served well and fairly. It must be noted that the arguments of this thesis can be achieved without a fundamental paradigm shift of Taiwan’s legal system, and can find their legal basis in existing laws. All they require are just some slight changes to judges’ way of legal thinking and how judges interpret some ordinary legal concepts such as “injury” and “standing,” plus, of course, some degree of environmental consciousness.

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