以佛教《雜阿含經》的基本觀點解消休謨的個人同一性問題

Solving the Problems of Hume’s Idea of Personal Identity: Based on Basic Views of the Saṃyuktāgama-Sūtra

黃薏文(I-Wen Huang)

指導教授 ： 蔡耀明

國立臺灣大學/文學院/哲學研究所/碩士(2010年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2010.01610

摘要

本文以佛教《雜阿含經》的基本觀點解消休謨的個人同一性問題，根據《雜阿含經》的經文義理，審視休謨談個人同一性觀念的理論；對於休謨最初立論時面對的傳統形上學之個人同一性問題，以及其個人同一性理論所引發的各種問題和困難，進行哲學思辨和進一步的解消。
休謨以經驗做為基礎，強調印象與知覺的實在性，任何超出人們經驗之外的論斷，都被休謨所質疑。他在檢視自我觀念和個人同一性觀念的過程中，批評傳統的個人同一性觀念來自於人們的虛構和想像。不過，休謨的理論雖然突破傳統舊有的思考框架，但是仍引發不少問題和困難。
世間實相是變動不已的條件緣起，所以固定且相對立的語詞和觀念，不能完整地顯示世界的真實樣貌。而自我與個人同一性觀念蘊含的個體性、持久性和相同的論斷式概念，皆為分別對立式的認定。根據佛教《雜阿含經》的緣起、無常、不二、空等基本觀點，對這些認定予以解開。
個人同一性的問題由其相關觀念所構成，但卻都是落入對立及認定的觀念，這便是個人同一性問題的癥結所在。因此，面對個人同一性的議題，不再接受相關觀念而進入問題去企圖回答，而是在此將傳統形上學的個人同一性問題解消，進而解消休謨個人同一性問題的困境。
最後，根據《雜阿含經》，將所謂單一生命體的觀念轉向相續生命歷程的觀察，來理解所謂的人或生命，並且藉由業力說，探討建立在個人同一性觀念之上的責任歸屬之議題。如此一來，解消個人同一性的問題，不只避免了其理論相關困難，亦可清楚而圓融地說明以個人同一為基礎的相關議題。

關鍵字

個人同一性 ； 自我 ； 休謨 ； 緣起 ； 無常 ； 不二 ； 空 ； 非我 ； 業報

並列摘要

In this article, I will employ the basic views of the Saṃyuktāgama-Sūtra to investigate Hume’s own theory of personal identity, and solve the problems of Hume’s idea of personal identity. I will also deal with the difficulties the western traditional theories face.
Hume takes one’s experience as the only foundation of knowledge, and emphasized the realness of sensation and perception; anything beyond that is to be taken as dubious. Thus, while examining ideas such as ‘the self’ and personal identity, he criticized the traditional approaches to the self as dealing with something merely illusionary. Though Hume’s theory of personal identity seems to progress beyond the traditional approaches, it also has its own difficulties.
The changing of the appearances of the world is caused by related conditions. Therefore, it is impossible to faithfully describe the reality of world by using fixed and relative/opposing expressions or ideas. The self and the idea of personal identity imply something individual, persisting and the assertive concept: ‘the same.’ These ideas, however, could only be defined through opposition. Drawing insight from the basic views of the Saṃyuktāgama-Sūtra, namely pratītya-samutpāda (dependent co-arising)、anitya (impermanence)、a-dvaya (non-duality)、śūnyatā (emptiness), I will show that the ideas on which the theories of personal identity are based are illegitimate.
The ideas related with the problem of personal identity could only be defined through opposition. This, I will show, is the crux of the problem. Once one has rejected these ideas, both the traditional problem of identity and Hume’s difficulties could be solved.
According to the Saṃyuktāgama-Sūtra, the idea of individuality must be given a new understanding, and shifted into the mutable flux of life. Through the examination of such a process, one could come to understand the very concept of ‘person’ or ‘life.’ In combination with the theory of karma, such an approach to the idea of personal identity could also shed light upon the problem of the attribution of responsibility, which is inevitably based on the very idea of personal identity. By solving the problems of personal identity, one could not only avoid the difficulties the theories of personal identity encounter, but also give a better explanation to issues which seem to be based on that very idea.

並列關鍵字

personal identity ； Self ； Hume ； dependent co-arising ； impermanence ； non-duality ； emptiness ； anātman ； karma

參考文獻

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