跨國併購的行政管制—以市場競爭及國家安全為核心

The Administrative Control of Cross-Border Merger and Acquisition：Focusing on Market Competition and National Security

呂儒亞(Ju-Ya Lu)

指導教授 ： 林明昕

國立臺灣大學/法律學院/法律學研究所/碩士(2017年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201703684

摘要

在經濟全球化的時代，資金、資源、人才的流動隨著國際組織間多邊、雙邊協議的擬定，以及貿易壁壘的消弭，而越趨自由化。跨國藩籬的破除也使企業積極向外拓展並於跨國市場中相互競逐，尋求最佳的投資標的以達營業利益的最大化，結果亦促成外國直接投資的總額逐年遞增。而外國直接投資中的跨國併購型態，相較於新創投資，對於地主國的影響尤甚，故如何建置出一套完善的管制模式，便為本文所聚焦之重點。
本文從跨國併購的管制理論出發，首先探究跨國併購管制的必要性，從正反面切入加以辯證，於證成管制的必要性及正當性後，繼而就我國現行管制架構作一探討，分殊成市場競爭審查及國家安全審查等兩種一般性的外資行政管制，佐以案例分析檢討現行制度之缺失。就檢視結果而言，前者於主管機關之實質審查標準具有內涵曖昧不明、階層紊亂之疑慮，且其附加之附款具有功能性不彰、正當合理關聯之質疑；後者則具有申報門檻闕如、審查期限不確定、潛規則障礙等程序面缺失，以及審查標準不明、潛規則充斥等實體審查面弊病。
為解決現行法制之疏漏，本文爬梳整理歐盟、德國、美國等三大經濟體之管制脈絡，區分市場競爭審查及國家安全審查，分別從背景脈絡、程序流程規定、矯正措施、實質審查標準等層面切入，完整呈現管制模式，其中並穿插案例呈現各國實務下跨國併購案件之處理模式。
綜合他山之石及個人見解，本文於文末提出數點建議。就市場競爭管制層面，公平會應改採顯著妨礙有效競爭標準，佐以部長許可制就整體經濟利益作全盤衡量。此外為解決附加附款之缺失，可以當事人主動提出，公平會被動許可為原則，並將附款之使用限縮在矯正措施之監督及落實；就國家安全審查機制層面，分別就投審會之組織架構及資訊公開、申報門檻之建置、雙軌制度存廢、引入事前協商階段、國家安全實質內涵的建構等，提出修法或制度面的檢討。希冀能藉由本文之研究與探討，使我國對於外資併購之管制制度更趨完善。

關鍵字

外國直接投資 ； 跨國併購 ； 併購管制 ； 市場競爭審查 ； 國家安全審查

並列摘要

In the age of economic globalization, owing to the agreements between multinational organizations and bilateral parties and the removal of trade barriers enacted by various economies, the transfer of capital funds, resources, and human resources have become freely available to homeland countries. It is the elimination of such constraints that makes international businesses proactively expand and compete for market shares in the international market as they look for the best target business to invest in so as to maximize their profits. As a result, global foreign direct investment has been increasing annually. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (cross-border M&As), compared to greenfield investments, affect home countries the most among all forms of foreign direct investment. Therefore, this article focuses on how to formulate a well-functioning system; a system that is clear, transparent, and consistent for foreign investors to conduct cross-border M&As.
This article begins with theories of regulation of cross-border M&As. First, it discusses the foundations of regulation— is it necessary to control cross-border M&As? After reviewing relative theories and proving the necessity of regulation, this article further looks into the Taiwan’s present regulatory framework, dividing it into two vital regulatory systems and reviews market competition and national security. In addition to introducing regulatory framework, this article refers to two prominent cases in order to analyze the deficiency of Taiwan’s cross-border merger control. In relation to market competition, this article reveals that the authority adopts uncertain reviewing standards, and also confusingly combines various factors into same layer, decreasing the willingness of foreign investors to merge with a Taiwan business. Furthermore, the merger remedies attached by the authority are criticized for losing their designed function, lacking proper and legitimate connection to their objectives. In relation to national security, the reviewing procedure makes no exemption for the minimum investment. Moreover, the uncertain examining term and potential rules unspecified in statue have created external obstacles for foreign investors. On the other hand, the ambiguity of substantial standards and unwritten rules reflects the political impediments to foreign investors who have been critical for years.
To modify the deficiencies mentioned above, the article reviews the regulatory frameworks in the European Union, Germany, and the United States, presenting the rationale of regulations, the procedural rules, merger remedies and substantial tests in these three economies. The theory cannot exist independently without practice; therefore, the article provides some benchmark cases, which present the practices enforced by different authorities in managing cross-border M&As.
After combining personal opinions with regulatory framework of different economies worth learning, this article proposes some advice in the conclusion. From the perspective of market competition review, the Fair Trade Commission shall revise its substantial test to Significant Impediment of Effective Competition, and it is suggested that the inheritance of ministry authorization is better for our merger control system in order to review mergers comprehensively. In addition, to improve the shortcomings concerned with the enforcement of merger remedies, merger parties shall be entitled to propose remedies actively, and the Fair Trade Commission may attach conditions and obligations in order to ensure that the parties concerned comply with the remedies they propose. From the perspective of national security review, suggestions are made to modify the defects criticized by foreign investors, including the composition of Investment Commission, disclosure of the decision-making process, reporting requirements under minimum capital investment, the dilemma on dual-track regulatory structure, importation of pre-notification contact, and the concept of national security. It is hoped that the suggestions provided by this article will make some contribution to Taiwan’s current regulatory framework.

並列關鍵字

Foreign Direct Investment ； Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions ； Merger Regulation ； Market Competition Review ； National Security Review

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