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  • 學位論文

論法律經濟學之方法論預設-以Coase與Posner之爭論為核心

A Treatise on the Methodology of Law and Economics:Clarification through the Debate between Coase and Posner

指導教授 : 簡資修
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摘要


台灣法學界對於法律經濟學這個流行於美國的法學方法,並不陌生。然而,法學界對於法律經濟學仍然存在相當多錯誤的認知。這些錯誤認知,事實上根源於對於法律經濟學的方法論預設沒有清楚地認識,才會產生錯誤期待或不必要的排斥。面對此一問題,本文嘗試藉由考察開創法律經濟學最為關鍵性的兩位學者:寇斯(Coase)以及波斯納(Posner)之間的爭論,考察法律經濟學的方法論預設。 本論文第一章提出問題意識,並回顧此一領域的相關文獻。   第二章開始,藉由考察影響法律經濟學最重要的「經濟學芝加哥學派」(Chicago School of Economics)的學術史,嘗試釐清法律經濟學產生的學術史背景,並且在這個脈絡下,引出寇斯以及波斯納關於法律經濟學最核心的幾個論點。在寇斯方面,本文認為,其最重要的三個學術概念,分別為:「交易成本」、「損害相互性」,以及「比較制度分析」。本文藉由此三組概念三位一體的特性,嘗試補正一般對於寇斯學術過於著重「寇斯定理」的錯誤認知;在波斯納方面,本文藉由全面性地檢視其文本,釐清其使用「財富最大化」,而不使用傳統「效用最大化」的理論根源,同時釐清其不使用最廣泛被接受的「柏雷拖效率」,而採用弱化的「卡爾多-希克斯標準」的理論意義。最後再將其法律經濟學,放入美國實用主義哲學的脈絡,嘗試更清晰地展現出波斯納的理論圖像。 在梳理完兩人的學術思想後,本文於第三章中,首先比較兩人對於法律經濟學最核心的兩個方法論預設:「方法論個人主義」以及「理性人效用最大化」的見解,並得出Posner與Coase分別屬於「建構理性-心理性個人主義」以及「生態理性-制度性個人主義」的結論。此外,本章也將觸角延伸到,兩人對於理論預設的本質應為「解釋」還是「預測」,以及理論的建構是否應該與現實相符的兩個爭論。波斯納基於其實用主義、工具主義的態度,認為法律經濟學的本質,應該是在預測被規範者受法律規範後的行為,以達成財富最大化的目標;另一方面,寇斯則非常堅持理論的目標是在解釋實際現象,而不是預測,是故理論預設絕對不應該悖離於現實。在寇斯的觀點下,理性人效用最大化的預設,就是最典型悖離於現實的預設,並且會將法律經濟學導向錯誤的路徑。 在考察完寇斯與波斯納兩人的學術及方法論差異後,本文在第四章中,舉出三個法學上的實例,考察兩人的方法論預設如何影響到實際的法學研究。分別為:1.財產規則與補償規則;2.過失責任的本質;3.物權法定主義是否應該被遵守。

並列摘要


Legal scholars in Taiwan are not unfamiliar with Law and Economics, as it represents an essential methodology well-established in the United States. Nevertheless, misconceptions with respect to this field are prevalent within the Taiwanese legal scholar community due to, in my opinion, an inadequate understanding of the very foundations of this discipline. Therefore, to clarify Law and Economics, my approach begins by analyzing the debate between the two founding fathers of this school: Ronald Coase and Richard Posner. Chapter one provides a review of the great body of literature aimed at explicating the differences between the methodologies developed by these leading figures. Chapter two reveals the immense contributions of Coase and Posner through the context of their significance in the culmination of the most influential school for Law and Economics, the Chicago School of Economics. I divide the fundamentals of Coase’s theory into three streams of ideas: transaction cost, reciprocal nature of harm, and comparative institutional analysis. First, a rediscovery of Coase’s theory is necessary as the “Coase Theorem” is the most widely recognized yet the most misleading starting point to understanding Coase. In studying Posner, on the other hand, my approach begins with a comprehensive illustration of why he adopts the term “wealth maximization” instead of the more widely accepted term “utility maximization”. This leads to my next analysis of why Posner opts for the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency standard rather than the more extensively used Pareto-efficiency standard. The final part of this chapter will integrate all of the ideas of Posner using the philosophical foundation of his theories. The most important assumptions underlying the foundations of Law and Economics may be categorized into “methodological individualism” and “rational man utility maximization”. In analyzing the views of Coase and Posner with respect to this dichotomy, while they both fall under “methodological individualism”, Coase can be shown to belong to “ecological rationality” and “institutional individualism”, while Posner belongs to “constructive rationality” and ”psychological individualism”. My investigation then progresses into their differing views on the essential meaning of jurisprudence, which include prediction and explanation. Under Posner’s pragmatism, he considers prediction, a tool in attaining the goal of wealth maximization, to be the essential meaning of jurisprudence. In contrast, Coase considers explanation, grounded on real phenomenon, to be the most important character of jurisprudence. Finally, after clarifying the assumptions of Coase and Posner on the methodology of Law and Economics, I select three debates in common law to demonstrate how their differences in methodology lead to different outcomes on legal issues: 1.Property rules versus liability rules 2.The nature of negligence: penalty or compensation 3.Numerus Clausus

參考文獻


•王文宇(2010),〈諾貝爾經濟學獎得主Williamson學說與應用�法學、經濟學
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•簡資修(1997),〈寇斯的《廠商、市場與法律》:一個法律人的觀點 (Coase's
•張五常(2009),《經濟學的缺環》,香港:花千樹。
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