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  • 學位論文

少數股東的保護─以股東盈餘分派請求權為中心

The Protection of Minority Shareholders -Focusing on Shareholder’s Right of dividends-

指導教授 : 蔡英欣

摘要


我國法上有關盈餘分派的規範,向來以保障債權人為主,公司法只規定公司何時不得發放盈餘,但並未規範何時必需發放盈餘。發放盈餘與否,原則上係由公司自行決定,公司若要進行盈餘分派,應由董事(會)餞行公司法上規定的程序後,提出盈餘分派計畫於股東會,並經股東會決議通過後方可進行盈餘分派。從公司法上的規定來看,似乎董事會和股東會都對於盈餘分派的決定有控制權限,但一般多認為最終的決定權限屬於股東會。但此種權限劃分的設計,需要董事會與股東會都恰當的履行其職責,只要有一個機關怠忽職守,股東就有可能無法獲得合理的盈餘分派。但在有機關怠忽職守時,我國法上少數股東往往面臨缺乏有效救濟途徑的困境,而這種情況容易出現在股東人數較少、公司經營階層由股東擔任的公司中。 本文針對少數股東面臨的困境,首先從探討可否利用股東提案權、公司法第194條股東制止請求權、選任臨時管理人、董事忠實義務等制度保障少數股東的盈餘分派請求權,但即便能以上述制度讓盈餘分派議案被提到股東會中,多數股東仍然可以運用其在股東會中的優勢不讓該議案通過,少數股東仍然拿不到應有的盈餘分派。而依照我國現行的規定以及實務見解,法院亦無法命股東作出分派盈餘的決議,故我國的少數股東陷入嚴重的困境。故本文嘗試參考外國法上解決類似問題的方式,以做為我國的借鏡。 在美國法上,亦曾出現少數股東盈餘分派權受侵害之案例,因美國法上盈餘分派權限原則屬於董事會,故美國法上原則上提供兩種模式的救濟途徑,第一種是股東可以提起命董事宣告發放盈餘的訴訟,但因為此類訴訟中採取原則不介入公司經營的態度,故要件限制十分嚴格,股東難以獲得勝訴的判決。第二種類型的訴訟則是限於閉鎖性公司,法院考慮閉鎖性公司股票缺乏交易市場,難以以市場力量監督公司經營,故加強董事及控制股東的忠實義務,各州的立法亦提供少數股東對抗多數股東壓迫的制度,例如少數股東可以聲請解散公司,或請求多數股東或公司買回其手中持股等,在這種類型訴訟中,股東獲得勝訴的機率較高,多數案件亦採取此種救濟途徑。 在英國法上,對於多數股東利用其持股優勢壓迫少數股東的行為,英國公司法設有不公平侵害制度,目前英國法上少數股東若認為多數股東長期不發放盈餘或只發放極低盈餘的行為侵害其盈餘分派請求權,多選擇以此套制度救濟。 我國之所以會有上述問題之發生,源自於少數股東保護制度之不足,鑒於我國多數股東會通常只是董事會的橡皮圖章,本文建議修法將盈餘分派的權限劃歸董事會,則如此一來,只要少數股東能成功的讓董事會作出盈餘分派之議案,即可得到應得之盈餘,又有鑑於此類爭議之發生常伴隨著公司股東間互信基礎之破滅,故亦應提供少數股東脫離公司的途徑,建議仿美國之立法例,讓少數股東得解散公司或請求公司或控制股東收買其手中持股,借由法院之介入,確保其能以合理的價格出售其手中持股或分得應有之公司資產。

並列摘要


Basically, the distribute part of Company Act in Taiwan is to protect debtors. Therefore, the company act in Taiwan only says when the company can’t distribute dividends but does not say when the company has to distribute dividends. The company can have their own decisions. The procedure is that the directors should make a resolution of distributing dividends and then send the resolution to the shareholder’s meeting. Only after the shareholder’s meeting pass the resolution can the company distribute dividends. So according to our law, the directors and shareholders both have power to decide whether to distribute dividends or not. Because the law divided the power of distributing dividends into two parts, the shareholders need both two organs do their duty loyally to get the dividends. If any of the organs does not do their duty loyally, the shareholders can’t get the dividends that they are entitled to get. In our country, there are cases that the directors or controlling shareholders abused their power and made the minority shareholders can’t get the dividends they are entitled to get. Unfortunately, because our law lack of the functions to protect minority shareholders’ right, the minority shareholders were stick in the unfair situation. The U.S and U.K also have the cases that the controlling shareholders (usually who also are the directors) abuse their power to make the minority can’t get the dividends they are entitled to get. Both of the countries have functions to solve this problem. In the U.S, the minority shareholders can choose to bring an action to compel directors to distribute dividends. But this kind of action applies to the business judgment rule, so the shareholders have to prove that the directors have bad faith, fraud or gross abuse of discretion. The requirements make shareholders hard to success in the action. However they minority shareholders in U.S have another option. If the company is a close company, the shareholder can use the function that was particularly designed for close company. In the function, the directors and controlling shareholders have enhanced fiduciary duty because of the minority shareholders in close are more vulnerable. Therefore, the minority shareholders of close company are easier to success in the suit. As for the U.K, they have a special function called unfair prejudice. The unfair prejudice deals with the problem that the controlling shareholders oppressed the minority shareholders. Most of the cases that the minority shareholders can’t get or only get little dividends are solved by the function. In this article, I suggest that we should revise our law and let the directors have the complete power to decide whether to distribute the dividend or not and to decide the amount of dividend. And the complete power also means the complete responsibility. If the directors don’t do their job loyally, according to our law the shareholders can sue them. I also suggest that we should have a function to let the oppressed minority shareholders to leave the company and sell their shares in a fair price.

參考文獻


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被引用紀錄


黃鯨洋(2018)。特別股的現在與未來:超越股東平等原則之限制與迷思〔碩士論文,國立臺灣大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201800684
謝育錚(2017)。私有化交易之法制建構〔碩士論文,國立臺灣大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201700714
程本伊(2014)。閉鎖性公司股東間之契約關係與治理結構── 從盈餘分派爭議切入〔碩士論文,國立臺灣大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2014.00625

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