貪污有害於經濟成長嗎？

Is Corruption Harmful For Economic Growth?

蒙志強(Chih-Chiang Meng)

指導教授 ： 陳明郎

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/經濟學研究所/碩士(2004年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2004.02023

摘要

本文將內生經濟成長模型應用到貪污的議題上，
探討當經濟體系存在貪污的現象時，
對於經濟體系當中的資源分配以及經濟成長等相關經濟變數的影響。
本文發現：

1.當個人貪污現象產生時，
在未加入政府追緝貪污的機制時，
我們發現短時間內個人貪污的增加會使得個人消費支出增加，
但是，
經濟體系重新調整達到新的恆定狀態後，
政府支出以及資本都將下降，
長期而言，
這將使得經濟成長率下降。

2.我們加入政府追緝貪污的機制，
政府可以利用徵收稅款以及追緝貪污這兩項政策工具，
來遏止貪污現象的蔓延時，
則經濟體系有可能因為政府這兩項政策工具的實行，
發生貪污反而有助於經濟成長率上升的現象。

關鍵字

資源分配 ； 貪污 ； 內生經濟成長 ； 經濟成長 ； 政府

並列摘要

In this paper we apply endogenous growth model into the study of the issue of corruption.We are concerned about the effect to the resource allocation and economic growth when it exists corruption in the economic environment.
The results show as the following:

First, we indicates that the increase of individual corruptions will lead to the increase of individual consumption expenditure in the short run when government doesn't set up mechanisms to chase individual corruption.
However, the government expenditure and capital will decrease due to the adjustment of economic system into the new steady state.n the long run,the increase of individual corruptions without government's chase mechanisms will lead to the decrease of economic growth,that is,corruption is harmful for economic growth.

Second,we add the mechanisms that government gets after the individual corruptions.They can use two policy instruments such as collecting taxes and chasing individual corruptions to inhibit the spread of corruption.It might happen that corruption is beneficial for economic growth due to the implementation of government's ploicy instruments.

並列關鍵字

endogenous economic growth ； corruption ； resource a

參考文獻

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