為利維坦立界線：不確定性與權力分立憲政抉擇

本文實證地檢驗不確定性對各國憲法制定不同權力分立程度的效果。本文參照選舉談判途徑打造理論架構，以闡明不確定性和權力分立憲政抉擇的關係，再從中推演出尚待經驗資料檢證的基本假設：不確定性與憲法制定的權力分立程度成正比。為了經驗地檢定此一假設，本文以「行政權力指標」測量權力分立程度，並以「選舉競爭程度」及「前三年平均經濟成長率」作為測量不確定性的代理變項，而且控制了其他的干擾變項，包含歷史地理因素、社會經濟條件、國內外政治因素與時間趨勢。基於一般最小平方法和跨國時間序列迴歸模型的結果，本文發現，行政權力指標與選舉競爭程度呈負相關，和前三年平均經濟成長率呈正相關，且兩者的迴歸係數達到統計上顯著。這一結果吻合理論預期，顯示基本假設未被證偽。因此，本文可以有信心地暫時接受這一命題：制憲者面臨的不確定性會系統地影響權力分立憲政抉擇的結果。

關鍵字

不確定性；權力分立；憲政抉擇；選舉談判途徑；跨國時間序列迴歸模型

並列摘要

This thesis empirically examines the effect of uncertainty on the degree of separation of powers stipulated by national constitutions. It offers a theoretical framework drawing on an electoral bargaining approach to illustrate the relationship between uncertainty and constitutional choices on separation of powers, and then deduces the basic hypothesis from the theory. The basic hypothesis, which would later be examined by empirical data, is that uncertainty is directly proportional to the degree of separation of powers stipulated by constitutions. To empirically test this hypothesis, this thesis measured the degree of separation of powers with “executive power index,” and used “electoral competitiveness” as well as “three-year average economic growth rate” as the proxy variables for measuring uncertainty, and then controlled other disturbing variables including historical and geographical factors, socio-economic conditions, international and domestic political factors, and time trends. Based on the results of ordinary least squares and time-series cross-sectional regression models, this thesis found that executive power index was negatively related to electoral competitiveness and positively related to three-year average economic growth, while the regression coefficients were statistically significant. The results fit the prediction of the theory and indicate that the basic hypothesis is not falsified. Therefore, this thesis can confidently yet tentatively accept this proposition: uncertainty faced by constitution drafters can systematically affect the outcomes of constitutional choices concerning the question of separation of powers.

並列關鍵字

uncertainty ； separation of powers ； constitutional choices ； electoral bargaining approach ； time- series cross-sectional regression model

參考文獻

林繼文，2006，〈政府體制、選舉制度與政黨體系：一個配套論的分析〉，《選舉研究》，13(2)：1-35。

蘇子喬，2010，〈憲政體系與選舉制度的配套思考〉，《政治科學論叢》，(44)：35-74。

邱銘哲、吳重禮，2012，〈研究文獻評閱與研究〉，瞿海源、畢恆達、劉長萱、楊國樞（編），《社會及行為科學研究法（一）：總論與量化研究法》，台北：東華，頁103-130。

Kutner, H. Michael, Christopher J. Nachtsheim, John Neter, and William Li. 2005. Applied Linear Statistical Models. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell. 2015. “V-Dem Codebook v5.” Varieties of Democracy (VDem) Project.

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為利維坦立界線：不確定性與權力分立憲政抉擇

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