- 學位論文
從團體迷思理論分析以色列應對贖罪日戰爭情報評估與決策失敗之研究
A Review of Israel’s Failure in Intelligence Assessment and Decision Making Before the Yom Kippur War: An Analysis Using the Groupthink Theory
摘要
以色列自從1948年建國之日起，歷經大小戰爭始終立於不敗之地。但埃及、敘利亞於1973年10月6日聯合對以色列發動奇襲，打破以色列不敗的神話。各界探究以色列情報機關為何沒有及時提出戰爭預警，檢視梅爾總理內閣的決策，試圖找出以色列遭受奇襲的原因。美國社會心理學家詹尼斯（Irving L. Janis）於1972年提出團體迷思理論探討小團體決策的問題。「團體迷思」意指在一個高度凝聚的團體中，團體成員力求一致的傾向凌駕了團體的其他任務，此種壓力導致成員心智效能、現實檢驗及道德判斷的衰退，因而減損了團體決策的能力，做出失敗的決策。本論文研究兼具實證與檢證理論之目的，採用個案研究法，蒐集贖罪日戰爭的歷史資料和相關文獻予以分析。首先介紹團體迷思理論的架構、各項理論要件與假設，然後以團體迷思理論檢視以色列於贖罪日戰爭的情報評估與內閣決策，探討以色列的情報評估和決策失敗是否受到團體迷思的影響，並藉此檢驗團體迷思理論的假設是否正確並可以操作。研究的結果顯示，以色列軍事情報局的情報評估受到團體迷思的影響，高度符合團體迷思理論的要件與假設。至於梅爾總理內閣的決策則與團體迷思理論不盡相符，難以作為支持團體迷思理論的適例。作者根據研究前述二個個案的結果分析比較，提出從本文研究所發現團體迷思理論的問題。
並列摘要
Ever since its establishment in 1948, Israel had been invincible through wars and battles. However, Egypt and Syria jointly launched a surprise attack on Israel on October 6, 1973, shattering the myth of Israel's invincibility. Efforts have been made to explore why Israeli intelligence agencies failed to provide timely warning of war and to investigate the decision-making process of Prime Minister Golda Meir's cabinet. In 1972, Irving L. Janis, an American social psychologist, developed the theory of groupthink in an attempt to explore potential sources for ineffective decisions made by a small group. The term “groupthink” refers to a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, where the members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action. The in-group pressure results in a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment, which contributes to poor decision making. This thesis proposes an empirical testing of the groupthink theory through the approach of case study. Historical data and literature related to the Yom Kippur War are collected and analyzed. Beginning with an introduction of the groupthink theory, the author then applies the theory to examine Israel's intelligence assessment and the cabinet’s decision-making during the Yom Kippur War. The aim is to examine whether Israel's intelligence assessment and the decision-making failures were the consequences of groupthink and to test the hypotheses of the theory. The results of the study reveal that the intelligence assessment of the Israeli intelligence assessment was influenced by groupthink. However, the Meir cabinet’s decision-making process does not meet all the elements of the theory and is not the best case in support of the groupthink theory. The analysis resulted from the two case studies illuminates some ineffectiveness of the theory.