我國銀行業盈餘管理動機、內部關聯性與監督機制對盈餘管理影響之研究

王富源

doi:10.6846/TKU.2010.00367

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我國銀行業盈餘管理動機、內部關聯性與監督機制對盈餘管理影響之研究

The Influences on Earnings Management of Earnings Management Motivations, Internal correlation and Monitoring Mechanisms in the Taiwanese Banking Industry.

王富源 , Masters　　Advisor：黃振豊;蔡信夫　　

繁體中文 DOI： 10.6846/TKU.2010.00367

裁決性應計數；盈餘管理；股權結構；監督機制；高階管理階層異動； Discretionary Accruals ； Earnings Management ； Ownership Structure ； Monitoring Mechanism ； Change of High Ranking Management

Abstract │ Reference (131) │ Times Cited (6) │ Altmetrics

Abstract 〈TOP〉

本研究係從銀行業盈餘管理動機、銀行業內部關聯性及外部監督機制三個構面切入，探討管理當局是否有利用裁決性壞帳或買賣有價證券損益兩項銀行業常用的盈餘管理工具從事盈餘管理，研究範圍及對象以民國88年至民國97年之國內上市(櫃)及金控旗下銀行為樣本，共計24家行庫。

隨著企業營運規模持續擴大，高階管理階層的經營績效便容易成為各方關注的焦點，依DeAngelo(1988)提出的論點，外部競爭者常會以企業盈餘不佳為由攻擊現任管理階層，而現任管理當局為保衛對企業之經營權，常會藉由操弄盈餘的方式美化其經營績效，因此，經營績效與盈餘管理可謂息息相關。此外，以往學者對於高階管理階層異動議題多聚焦於與公司績效間關聯性，研究結論並無一致，一派學者認為當公司經營績效下降時，公司會以更換高階管理階層方式來提昇績效；而另一派學者則認為當公司更換高階管理階層後，反而會導效公司經營績效滑落，因為繼任者會有洗大澡(Take a bath)的盈餘管理現象。本研究於高階管理階層異動該項變數與盈餘管理具相關性時，將進一步分析高階管理階層異動與否之樣本銀行於各構面之差異性，並觀察其內部股權結構變化及外部監督機制是否能有效發揮。

實證結果發現：(一)銀行業盈餘管理動機構面：高階管理階層確有利用裁決性壞帳與買賣有價證券損益二項銀行業常用的盈餘管理工具從事盈餘管理，與相關文獻及本研究假說預期相同有買回股權、現金增資、損益平穩及高階異動四項變數；但符合資本適足率該項變數則與相關文獻及預期相反，可能因樣本銀行之資本適足率已逾法規門檻且偏高，高階管理階層便有從事盈餘管理降低過高資本適足率之動機。(二)銀行內部關聯性構面：當樣本銀行為金控成員時，因各子公司間資源較多且能分享，使得高階管理階層有利用該項優勢從事盈餘管理的情形。另外，高階管理階層雖具家族成員背景，不容易因績效不佳而被撤換，但實證顯示部分樣本銀行雖具家族成員背景，卻因案而遭解職或因經營績效不佳而遭併購，使管理經層雖有家族成員背景仍難逃被撤換。(三)外部監督機制構面：當樣本銀行公股持股比重越高，則公股代表介入董事會程度越深，越能抑制管理階層從事盈餘管理；而董監事質押比率越高時，受金融監理機構及社會大眾關注程度也越高，致使董監事股權質押比率高的行庫其盈餘管理程度不升反降。

此外，本研究進一步探討高階管理階層異動年度與盈餘管理之差異性，實證發現董事會人數多或政府持股比率越高的樣本銀行，於高階管理階層未異動年度，確實能發揮其外部監督的功能，有效抑制高階管理階層從事盈餘管理。

Parallel Abstract 〈TOP〉

The research focuses on three dimensions of earnings management motivations in banking, bank’s internal correlation and external monitoring mechanisms to explore whether senior management involves in earnings management with discretionary bad debts or Securities Gain and Loss which are common in earnings management in banking industry. The study covers 24 domestic TWSE (OTC) listed banks and banks under financial holding companies from 1999 to 2008.

As operation is getting larger and larger, performance of senior management tends to be the focus of all people. According to DeAngelo (1988), outside competitors often attack current senior management with poor profits. To defend the operation right, current senior management manipulates earnings management to make the performance better. Thus, business performance is closely related to earnings management. In the past, domestic and foreign scholars focused on business performance in issues of senior management changes. The conclusions are not consistent. One school of scholars believe, when business performance worsens, companies change senior management to enhance performance; the other hold that change of senior management only result in worse performance, as successors take a bath earnings management. This study intends to make further analysis of the differences in every dimension in the sample banks that have senior management change or not, when the variable “senior management change” has correlation with “earnings management.” also, it intends to observe whether the changes of the banks’ internal shareholding structure and their external monitoring mechanism can be exerted effectively or not.

The evidence-based results have shown: (1) Dimension of the motivation for earnings management in banking: Senior management really engages in earnings management with discretionary bad debts or Securities Gain and Loss — the two commonly-applied tools for earnings management in banking; there are four variables — stock repurchase, cash increment, income smoothing, and senior management changes — similar to the ones in related literatures and the anticipations in this study’s hypothesis. However, the variable conforming to BIS is contrary to the ones in related literatures and the anticipations, perhaps because the BIS in the sample banks have exceeded the thresholds of laws and regulations and are higher; hence, senior management will have the motivation for engaging in earnings management to reduce the excessive BIS. (2) Dimension of bank’s internal correlation: When the sample banks are members of financial holding, each subsidiary is able to own and share many more resources, so that senior management tends to engage in earnings management by utilizing such an advantage. Besides, although senior management is usually from backgrounds of family members and they may not be replaced due to poor performance, however, according to evidence-based results, even though parts of the sample banks are from backgrounds of family members, they were dismissed from office due to cases or they were merged due to poor business performance. Therefore, even though the management is from backgrounds of family members, they still may be replaced unavoidably. (3) Dimension of external Monitoring mechanism: When the sample bank has higher ratio of government shareholding, the representatives of government shareholding will intervene the board of directors more profoundly and they will be more capable to inhibit the management from engaging in earnings management. When it has higher pledged shares ratio of directors’ and supervisors’ shareholdings, it will earn much more attention from financial Monitoring institutions and the social public, so that the degree of earnings management in the bank that has higher pledged shares ratio of directors’ and supervisors’ shareholdings will descend, instead of rising.

Besides, this study has made further exploration of the differences between years of senior management change and earnings management. The evidence-based results have shown: In terms of the sample banks that have many more directors or higher ratios of government shareholding, they can really exert their external monitoring functions in the years without senior management change, able to effectively inhibit senior management from engaging in earnings management.

Reference ( 131 ) 〈TOP〉

◆ 王克陸、彭雅惠、陳美燁(2007)「台灣金控子公司銀行經營績效之評估-使用DEA方法」，科技管理學刊，第12卷第2期，P1-27。
連結：
◆ 李佳玲(2002)，「公司績效與高階管理者離職之實證研究」，證券櫃檯，第67卷，P46-56。
連結：
◆ 李佳玲、葉穎蓉與何晉滄(2005)，「績效、公司治理與高階管理者離職關係之實證研究」，中山管理評論，第13卷第1期，P75-106。
連結：
◆ 李馨蘋，劉清明(2007)，「從公司治理與企業績效之觀點看高階主管異動之因素」真理財經學報，第16期，P1-22。
連結：
◆ 李馨蘋、何喜將(2007)，「銀行業之公司治理機制如何影響銀行風險承擔行為」，會計與公司治理，第4卷第2期，P1-22。
連結：

Times Cited (6) 〈TOP〉

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