兩岸通航政策對貨櫃航商在高雄港佈署航線之影響研究

The Impacts of across Strait Shipping Policy on the Containership Line's Routing Deployment including Kaohsiung Port

張雅富(Ya-Fu Chang)

指導教授 ： 陳春益

長榮大學/管理學院/經營管理研究所(博)/博士(2010年)

https://doi.org/10.6833/CJCU.2010.00135

摘要

台灣海峽兩岸的海運通航，自1949年起即因兩岸的政治對立而終止，其後隨著兩岸不同階段的通航政策之變動，航商也有不同的因應方案產生。配合兩岸及對外貿易運輸需求，1997年7月香港移交中國大陸前，台灣先以香港為第三地的轉運港口；1997年4月在於高雄港開始「境外航運中心」，由高雄港與廈門、福州進行兩岸直接通航，最後於2008年12月開始海峽兩岸港口的直接通航。
航商在兩岸三地的貨櫃船航線佈署，由於兩岸有政策上階段性的管制，因此該區域的航線佈署發展異於一般的自由航運市場。特別是海運的軸輻式網路，因通航港口及轉運貨櫃受到限制，使一般軸輻式網路無法在兩岸港口有效建立。兩岸海運通航政策各自有其政治立場，因兩岸通航政策管制重點主要可分為航線定位、船舶國籍、貨櫃運送、通航港口等四項，本文從此四項來分析不同階段的通航政策之差異及對航商之影響。
高雄港「境外航運中心」是兩岸正式接觸前的直航試驗方法，目的是在1997年以後取代香港為兩岸海運的轉運地位，也促使中國大陸開放廈門港。廈門港由於地理位置與高雄港相近，也形成高雄港的競爭對手。本文分析1994-2007年主要航商在香港、廈門及高雄港的貨櫃船航線及彎靠港口次數，發現香港並未因1997年回歸中國大陸而影響其世界海運轉運中心的樞紐港地位，而廈門港因高雄港「境外航運中心」同期開始發展貨櫃船航線，世界貨櫃港排名快速躍升。而高雄港「境外航運中心」隨著2008年12月兩岸直航而結束轉運第三地的角色，高雄港因受兩岸直航政策的限制，在1997-2007年並未爭取到中國大陸及歐洲等主要航商的貨櫃船航線，故港口貨櫃量成長率開始趨緩，並造成其世界貨櫃港排名下降。
高雄港在面臨兩岸港口於2008年12月全面海運直航新情勢，考量航商貨櫃船在本地區的佈署，在去除政策的通航限制後，將回歸自由航運市場經營。本文以電腦軟體建立數學規劃模式來測試中國大陸各港群選擇轉運樞紐港時，考慮各港口之間的運量、運輸成本、港口成本及距離等，發現高雄港有機會成為中國大陸華北及華中港口的遠東-歐洲航線的貨櫃轉運樞紐港，航商可將接駁航線密集連接至高雄港，再以大型貨櫃船集中運送至歐洲。遠東-北美航線因貨源集中在東南亞及華北，高雄港較不易增加此航線的貨櫃船航線。

關鍵字

航運政策 ； 航線 ； 境外航運中心 ； 貨櫃船 ； 高雄港

並列摘要

The cross-strait sea transportation connection between Taiwan and Mainland China had been disrupted since 1949 due to the political confrontation between the Taiwan and Mainland China. Afterwards, with the changes of shipping policies in different stages, the containership lines had also changed their route deployment service. To meet the demands from the two sides and the transportation for cross-strait trading, before Hong Kong’s return to the Chinese sovereignty in April 1997, Taiwan firstly took Hong Kong as the transshipment port as the so-called third place link Taiwan and Mainland China in April 1997, Kaohsiung Harbor began to establish “Offshore Shipping Center” for direct navigation between Kaohsiung Harbor and Xiamen and Fuzhou and finally, in December 2008, the direct navigation between the ports on two sides began.
Owing to the phased control measures adopted in the policies between the two sides, the development of shipping line’s routing deployment by the shipping companies on Taiwan, Hong Kong and Mainland China is different from that in the ordinary free shipping markets. Particularly, limited by navigation ports and transshipment containers, the ordinary hub-and-spoke network of sea transportation couldn’t be effectively established at the ports on two sides. The sea transportation navigation policies by the governments on two sides have their own political positions. The key points of control under the navigation policies adopted by the two sides can be divided into four items: shipping line positioning, ship nationality, container transportation and navigation ports. This article tries to analyze the difference of the shipping policy in different phases and their impacts on the shipping companies.
Kaohsiung port’s “Offshore Shipping Center” is a test method for direct navigation before direct shipping link between the governments on two sides. Its purpose is to replace Hong Kong as a transshipment position in the sea transportation between the two sides. It also leads to the opening of Xiamen Harbor by the Mainland China authorities. The geographical position of Xiamen Harbor is close to Kaohsiung Harbor that it thus becomes a competitor of Kaohsiung Harbor. This article analyzed the containership routes of major shipping companies and times for taking berth in ports including Hong Kong, Xiamen and Kaohsiung. It found that Hong Kong’s position as a hub of the world maritime transshipment center did not change after its return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. But Xiamen Harbor began to develop containership routes because of the establishment of Kaohsiung Harbor’s “Offshore Shipping Center” and its rankings of container ports in the world have been quickly jumped. With the direct navigation between two sides in December 2008, Kaohsiung Harbor’s “Offshore Shipping Center” thereby ended its role as the third place for transshipment. Limited by the direct navigation policies adopted by the Taiwan and Mainland China, Kaohsiung Harbor had not won over the containership routes of Mainland Chinese and European major shipping companies during 1994-2007. Therefore, the growth of containers in Kaohsiung Harbor began to slow down and the rankings in the world container harbors have been going down.
Facing the new situation of full-scale direct shipping link between the ports on two sides the change of December 2008, Kaohsiung port has to take into consideration that the deployment of containership lines sets to return to the operation in a free shipping market after lifting the restrictions on navigation. This study tested using the model constructed by computer software the considerations by the ports on Mainland China of transportation volume and cost and port cost and distance in choosing their transshipment hub. We found that Kaohsiung Harbor had opportunity to become a container transshipment hub for the ports on Northern China and Central China in their Far East-Europe routes. The shipping companies can link intensively their feeder routes to Kaohsiung Harbor before gathering up the seaborne cargo and transporting them by large containerships to Europe. Because most of the sources of cargo for the Far-East shipping routes are in Southeast Asia and Northern China, it is not easy for Kaohsiung Harbor to be an extra point for their Far-East shipping routes.

並列關鍵字

Shipping policy ； Shipping route ； Containership ； Offshore shipping center ； Kaohsiung Port

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