我國獨立董監制度自2007年1月1日正式上路,但新上市上櫃公司於2002年,即規定應設置獨立董監事,所以實際上獨立董監制度在我國已行有多年歷史。獨立董監制度,除可引入具會計、財務專業人才參與公司經營,使公司經營更佳合理化、專業化;另一方面因獨立董監事對公司並無直接利害關係,能避免利益衝突產生,可有效控管公司,對投資者權益有更佳保障。 本研究以2004年至2006年間的上市(櫃)公司,選取設置獨立董監事的公司與未設置獨立董監事的公司,就其經營績效與設置獨立董監事關係進行實證分析。再者,本研究以2003年至2007年間的上市(櫃)公司,將設置前後之經營績效的關係進行實證分析。最後,本研究再以2004年至2006年間有設置獨立立董監事的上市(櫃)公司,將公司區分為董監持股比例高低、董監事持股質押比例高低,及董監事酬勞高低三種,分別來研究與公司經營績效之關係。利用SPSS統計軟體,進行混合設計多因子變異數分析 (mixed design ANOVA) 或魏克遜符號等級考驗 (Wilcoxon signed ranks test) 檢定分析。 實證結果如下: 1.研究發現,設置獨立董監事的公司,其總資產報酬率 (ROA) 、股東權益報酬率 (ROE) 、每股盈餘 (EPS) 顯著高於未設置獨立董監事的公司,表示設置獨立董監事之公司,其經營績效優於無未設置獨立董監事之公司。 2.研究發現,設置獨立董監事的公司,其設置後之總資產報酬率(ROA) 、股東權益報酬率 (ROE) 、每股盈餘 (EPS) 顯著高於設置前,表示設置後之經營績效優於設置前。 3.研究發現,董監事持股比例高的公司之總資產報酬率 (ROA) 、股東權益報酬率 (ROE) 、每股盈餘 (EPS) 相較於董監事持股比例低的公司,兩者均沒有顯著的差異,表示有設置獨立董監事之公司,其董監事持股比例高低與公司經營績效沒有關係。 4.研究發現,董監事持股質押比例高的公司,其總資產報酬 (ROA) 、股東權益報酬率 (ROE) 、每股盈餘 (EPS) 顯著低於董監事持股質押比例低的公司,表示有設置獨立董監事之公司,其董監事持股質押比例高的經營績效劣於董監事持股質押比例低的經營績效。 5.研究發現,董監事酬勞高的公司,其總資產報酬率 (ROA) 、股東權益報酬率 (ROE) 、每股盈餘 (EPS) 顯著高於董監事酬勞低的公司,表示有設置獨立董監事之公司,其董監事酬勞高的經營績效高於董監事酬勞低的經營績效。
The legalization of the systems of independent directors and supervisors was put into practice in Taiwan on January 1, 2007, but those systems should be set up for the new OTC listed companies in 2002 according to the provisions of the laws. As a matter of fact, the systems of independent directors and supervisors have been implemented in Taiwan for many years. In addition to the introduction the of the accounting and financial professionals in operating a business for better rationalization and specialization, the systems of independent directors and supervisors provide the company more effective management as well as the rights and interests of the investors better protection without any conflict of interests arising, since those systems have no direct stake in the company. First of all, this study analyzed empirically the relationship between the firm performance and the companies with or without the setting of independent directors and supervisors under the selection of the OTC listed companies during 2004 to 2006. On the other hand, the firm performances between the former and the later settings of the independent directors and supervisors of the OTC listed companies during 2003 to 2007 are also analyzed empirically. Finally, this study analyz the relationship of the firm performance of the OTC listed companies among the ownership shares, the pledged shares, and the remuneration of the independent directors and supervisors during 2004 to 2006 respectively. The empirical analysis of this study is based on the methods of the mixed design ANOVA and the Wilcoxon signed ranks test by SPSS. The empirical results of this study are as follows: 1.The ROA, ROE, and EPS of the companies with the setting of independent directors and supervisors are all significantly higher than those without the setting of independent directors and supervisors. This shows that the firm performance of the companies with the setting of independent directors and supervisors is superior to those without the setting of independent directors and supervisors. 2.The ROA, ROE, and EPS of the companies with the later setting of independent directors and supervisors are significantly higher than those with the former setting of independent directors and supervisors. This shows that the firm performance of the companies with the later setting of independent directors and supervisors is superior to those with the former setting of independent directors and supervisors. 3.There is no significant differences in the ROA, ROE and EPS among the companies with the ownership share of the setting of independent directors and supervisors. This shows that the firm performance and the ownership share of the companies with the setting of independent directors and supervisors are irrelevant. 4.The ROA, ROE, and EPS of the companies with high pledged share percentage of the setting of independent directors and supervisors are all significantly higher than those with low pledged share percentage. This shows that the firm performance of the companies with high pledged share percentage is worse than those with low pledged share percentage. 5.The ROA, ROE, and EPS of the companies with high reward of the setting of independent directors and supervisors are all significantly higher than those with low remuneration. This shows that the firm performance of the companies with high remuneration is superior to those with low reward.
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