市場是否可以正確評價員工分紅資訊-員工分紅費用化前後之影響

Can Market Correctly Evaluate the Employee Bonus Information – The Impact of Expensing Employee Bonus

黃國書(Guo-Shu Huang)

指導教授 ： 陳昭蓉

中原大學/商學院/會計研究所/碩士(2012年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu201200371

摘要

摘要
我國商業會計法在2006年5月24日修訂，並於2008年1月1日開始實施員工分紅費用化。故本文欲探討員工分紅費用化後，員工分紅對於公司價值之影響。本文主要研究問題為：(1)在員工分紅費用化之後，發放員工分紅之激勵(稀釋)效果是否較費用化前明顯，及(2)員工分紅費用化後，市場投資人對於員工分紅資訊是否可以理性預期，(3)公司成長性高低對於公司員工分紅制度與公司價值之關係是否有影響。本文研究期間為1996至2010年，以我國上市、櫃公司為研究對象。實證結果顯示：(1)全部的樣本或高成長性樣本在費用化後發放員工現金紅利其激勵效果較費用化前明顯，(2)但低成長性的樣本在費用化後發放員工現金紅利及員工認股權，其稀釋效果比費用化前來的明顯，顯示投資人對於成長性不同的公司發放員工分紅有不同之評價。
本文進一步探討費用化後市場投資人對於員工分紅資訊是否有理性預期，實證結果顯示：(1)在全部的樣本中，市場投資人在員工分紅費用化後，對於員工現金紅利、股票紅利及董監事酬勞比費用化前較能理性預期，表示員工分紅費用化後，財務報表可真實的表達企業財務狀況及經營成果，以提高財務報表的資訊性，故投資者較能解讀員工分紅資訊，對於員工分紅資訊較費用化前有理性預期，(2)在高成長性的樣本，在費用化後，市場投資人對於員工現金紅利比費用化前過度反應，表示成長性較高的企業因較具有未來投資機會，投資者會給予較高的評價，故會高估員工分紅資訊，(3)在低成長性的樣本，在費用化後，市場投資人對於員工認股權比費用化前反應不足，表示低成長性企業未來投資機會較低，當員工分紅費用化之後，投資者會對於公司股價及獲利能力會產生下修的情形，並給予較低的評價，故會低估員工分紅資訊。

關鍵字

理性預期 ； 激勵效果 ； 公司價值 ； 員工分紅費用化

並列摘要

Abstract
Article 64 in Business Accounting Law in Taiwan was revised on May 24, 2006, and expensing employee bonus on January 1, 2008. This study investigates the impact of employee bonus on firm value after expensing employee bonus. The purpose of this study is to examine (1) whether the incentive (diluted) effect of employee bonus is more pronounced after expensing employee bonus? (2) Can the market investors rationally reflect the information of employee bonus after expensing employee bonus. (3) Whether the growth opportunities influence the relation between employee bonus and firm value? Study samples are from listed and over-the-counter companies in Taiwan using data from 1996-2010.
The empirical results show that (1) In the full sample or high-growth subsample, the incentive effect of employee cash bonus on the firm value is more pronounced after expensing employee bonus. (2) In the low-growth subsample, the diluted effect of employee cash bonus and employees stock option on the firm value is more obvious after expensing employee bonus. That means the market investors toward employee bonus for the different growth companies have different evaluation.
This study further examines that whether market investors rationally reflects the information of employee bonus after expensing employee bonus. Empirical results find that (1) After expensing employee bonus, financial statements correctly express the company financial position and operating results, thereby improving the information quality of financial statements. The market investors rationally reflect the information of employee cash and stock bonus and remuneration of directors and supervisors after expensing employee bonus in full sample. (2) In the high-growth subsample, the market investors overprice the information of employee cash bonus after expensing employee bonus. The empirical results indicate that the market investors overestimate firm value because of high future investment opportunities. Therefore, the market investors overprice the employee bonus information. (3) In the low subsample, the market investors underprice the information of employee’s stock option after expensing employee bonus. The empirical results indicate the market investors give the low evaluation because of low future investment opportunities. And the market investors are modify the stock price and profitability. Therefore the market investors underprice the employee bonus information.

並列關鍵字

Firm Value ； Rational Expectation ； Incentive Effect ； Expensing Employee Bonus

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