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  • 學位論文

經貿優惠政策與WTO規範權衡—我國經貿優惠政策之兩難

The Balance of National Policy between Designing Economic Incentives and Complying with the WTO Rules - the Dilemma for Regulating Economic Incentives in Taiwan

指導教授 : 鄺承華
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摘要


身為WTO會員國成員之台灣,雖自然資源匱乏,且島國市場狹小,但卻有亞洲地區戰略位置之優勢,四周上有技術精密先進之日本,左有資本及市場雄厚之中國,更別說技術及市場競爭力對我國產生嚴重威脅之我國主要競爭國—韓國,當然,還有環繞我國之其他東協成員國家,但在經濟全球化下,我國之經濟發展卻因國家經貿政策未發揮而停滯不前,甚至衰退。 國家經濟貿易政策相當廣泛,補貼、關稅、反傾銷稅、平衡稅、自製率規定、防衛措施、投資獎勵措施、稅制…等,皆為可能影響國家經濟發展之經濟貿易措施,而對於試圖建立一平等且自由之貿易環境的世界貿易組織,亦訂定與此等政策相關之規範,包括補貼及平衡措施協定、關稅及貿易總協定、服務貿易總協定、與貿易有關之投資措施協定…等,然國家之經貿政策及法規雖受此等規範限制,但仍有若干差異,故此,形成「法域競爭」,企業既開宗明義即係以營利為目的之單位,其經營勢必尋求最適成本以創造利潤,故規範套利因應產生,企業藉由「發行人之選擇」,將資金、技術與資產於跨國間流動,選擇最有利之法律公共財,或規避法規之限制,過去,台灣對於赴陸投資予以設限,企業便藉由第三地繞道投資中國以規避相關規範即為一例。 跨國企業藉由集團企業於較符合營運規劃目的之國家選擇為設立登記地後,再輔以交易安排,創造最低稅負及營運成本,及最高之營運效益,但此等法域競爭不僅創造了企業設立登記地競爭,卻也可能造成國家稅基之侵蝕,進而衍生國家課稅權之競爭,各國為捍衛其課稅權,紛紛以移轉訂價、反資本弱化…等反避稅措施因應,惟因涉及他國,尚需與他國訂定租稅協定,始可產生較佳之效果,而1995年後FTA之大幅增加,亦對國際間之貿易關係產生巨大影響,除加入WTO外,與他國建立更密切之貿易夥伴關係,將更有助於提升國家之競爭力。 國家經貿政策除影響產業之發展及企業是否根留台灣外,亦影響他國企業是否來台投資,過於寬鬆之經貿優惠政策消耗國家資源,亦易引起與他國之爭端,然力道不足之經貿優惠政策卻又不足以吸引投資,不具競爭力,企業利潤、國家利益及國際經貿秩序之衡平,是一困難之課題。

並列摘要


The market economy in Taiwan is constrained by its limited natural resources and the fact that it is an island. On the other hand, Taiwan, as a member of the WTO, is in a magnificent strategic geographic location with China to its west, Japan and South Korea to its north, and the Philippines and Vietnam to its south. However, Taiwan’s recent economic development has come to a standstill due to internal economic regulations’ failure to be elaborated under the globalization. There are a few factors that may influence the economic trade measures in promoting the development of a national economy, such as subsidies, tariffs, anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties, content rate regulations, safeguards, measures of encouragement of investment and taxation, and so on. Nevertheless, the aforesaid measures are regulated by the ASCM (Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures), GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) and TRIM (Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures) under the WTO framework. The controlling authority has to consider how it will implement the terms of the international agreements when legislating national economic regulations. As a result of this, the internal economic regulations and norms vary from country to country and jurisdictional competition is more of a consideration as well. Enterprises which regard business as their priority can practice regulatory arbitrage. For example, enterprises may be able to find better financing terms by practicing this type of international arbitrage. Enterprises can also either choose the legal public goods that benefit them the most or the limitation of circumvention measures. In the past, enterprises bypassing investment in Mainland China due difference in corporate taxation was a clear example. Taiwan enterprises use the regulatory arbitrage to dodge the legal regulation managed and controlled by the government of Taiwan. They invest offshore companies in the third country through a roundabout approach. The jurisdictional competition has caused corporate charter competition; it derives the competition of national taxing powers as well. Multinational enterprises have created the lowest tax cost via a conglomerate that has established the place of registration in countries with optimal regulations and trade arrangements at the same time. However, this practice has damaged the base of national tax. To secure their taxing powers, various countries have come up with different measures to protect themselves, such as transfer pricing, anti-thin capitalization, and so on. Since some other countries might get involved in this, they have the need to sign tax treaties in order to bring the best result at the end. On the other hand, FTA has increased greatly since 1995; it influences international trade as well. Apart from joining the WTO, the governmental authority should establish a close trade relationship with other countries. It may definitely make the authority more competitive in the future. National economic regulations affect not only the development of industries but the decision making process for enterprises considering if they should stay in Taiwan. It also influences the willingness of foreign enterprises to invest in Taiwan. Excessively yielding economic incentives may consume national resources and cause dispute with other countries. Nonetheless, the economic incentives are not attractive enough for other enterprise but they are not competitive either. The balance of enterprise profit, national benefit, and international economic harmony is a critical economic issue going forward.

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