針對現行公平交易法之結合申報制度,OECD與部分學者,認為我國申報門檻兼採市場占有率及營業(銷售)額作為雙軌之結合申報門檻,而市場占有率作為申報門檻有其未盡完善之處,包括如結合申報門檻之實用性低,且個別事業市場占有率之計算,因市場界定及劃分不易,而難以客觀衡量等。此外,結合申報制度除強制要求事業申報結合行為外,亦有自願之結合申報制度,為英國、澳洲等國所採,由於強制申報可能造成事業較大之負擔,且較僵固不具彈性。是故,本文藉由比較美國與英國之競爭法,作為我國公平交易法之借鏡,因前者乃是採強制性且單軌(僅採營業額)申報門檻之制度;後者則係自願性且雙軌(兼採市場占有率及營業額)申報門檻之制度,由兩者截然不同之制度中,檢視我國目前公平交易法之結合申報制度,是否妥適。此外,本文並以法律經濟分析中之成效分析方式,透過假設達執法之威嚇目的下,比較不同制度之執法成本中,包括行政管制之程序執法成本,與執法之型Ⅰ及型Ⅱ錯誤成本,試圖分析自願與強制,以及單軌暨雙軌之申報門檻,何者較佳而較具經濟效率,而最終比較結果,則係自願及單軌之申報制度較具經濟效率。
This thesis is to review the current merger notification of the Fair Trade Act in Taiwan and to recommend more economic efficient merger notification. Currently both market share and financial institution are used in parallel as the threshold of merger notification in Taiwan. This study compared the merger notification of the United States and the United Kingdom, which represent 2 typical merger notifications, compulsory using only financial institution as threshold and voluntary using both market share and financial institution. The cost-benefit analysis method was employed to analyze the economic efficiency of the compulsory and voluntary merger notifications including only financial institution or including both financial institution and market share as the threshold. By comparing the enforcement cost, including regulatory cost and type I and type II error cost, voluntary merger notification and only financial institution as the threshold are more economic efficient than others and recommended.