本文欲研究公司在初次公開發行存託憑證前所建立的銀行關係是否能夠改善資訊不對稱的問題,進而減少存託憑證初次發行的折價幅度。在本文中,承銷商類型可以區分為商業銀行及證券商兩類,哪一類型的承銷商能夠減低初次發行的折價幅度,也是本文所要探討的問題。此外,初次公開發行存託憑證的承銷商聲譽高低是否有助於減少其折價幅度亦是本文所要探討的部分。 在承銷商聲譽方面,則是採用 Megginson and Weiss (1991) 之計算方式,以承銷商的承銷總額佔該年度承銷總額的比例計算而得。在探討初次發行新股會有折價情形發生的相關論文中,對於影響初次發行折價的因素中,資訊不對稱理論佔有很大比例,這些論文中大部分皆認為承銷商、發行公司與投資人三者之間由於存在著資訊不對稱的問題,因此會有初次發行新股折價的問題發生,而折價的嚴重程度,則須視存在於承銷商、發行公司與投資人之間的資訊不對稱程度有多大,資訊不對稱愈嚴重,發行新股時折價的幅度也就愈大。
This study examines the effects of pre-IPO banking relationships on a firm’s IPO. I test whether banking relationships established before the firm’s IPO ameliorate asymmetric information problems behind high IPO underpricing. In this study, underwriter type can be divided into two types – commercial bank and security company. And which underwriter type can lower the level of underpricing. Besides, we also examines the relationship between the underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing. We calculate the underwriter reputation developed by Megginson and Weiss (1991). This is calculated as the gross proceeds for an underwriter divided by total gross proceeds for the sample. Many papers about IPO underpricing, asymmetric information play an important role. Most of these papers think that asymmetric information exist among underwriter、issuing firms and investors. And this phenomenon induces the IPO underpricing. The level of underpricing is depend on the level of asymmetric information. The relationship between the level of underpricing and the degree of asymmetric information is positive.
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