法律、計畫與規範性

Law, Plan and Normativity

侯士雋(Shih-Chun Hou)

指導教授 ： 莊世同

國立臺北大學/法律學院/法律學系/碩士(2013年)

摘要

「法律是什麼？」是英美法理學界的核心議題，經過近半世紀的發展也延伸出法律的本質、法律的規範性等重要課題。其中最具爭議性且饒富趣味的可以說是法實證主義與反法實證主義的理論對立，對於前者來說，法律並非政治道德的一種，因此他們致力於提出不同於道德的實體，並試圖證明該實體是理解法律本質的最佳對照，例如規範陳述、規則、命令等，以對抗反法實證主義者(包括自然法論者)的理論主張。
在2011年Scott J. Shapiro提出了另一種新穎的法律對照：法律是計畫。他建構了法律計畫理論、並宣稱其為計畫實證主義，是近年來在這領域中豐富且創新的研究成果。因此我選定該理論作為本篇論文的研究對象，主要著重在它對法律本質議題的分析，且提出一些診斷與反思，並對其理論隱晦之處─法律的規範性─進行審視與批判。
我認為依循著哈特式的理論途徑至此，可以說一般法理論與哲學上的行動理論產生了高度匯流的面貌，研究法律是什麼某種程度來說相當於研究「社會成員在作什麼」。另外，法律計畫理論如果要證成計畫是對法律的最佳理解與詮釋，並堅守計畫實證主義的主張，至少要對「法律具有道德目標」這個特殊的命題如何與分離命題能夠相並存，提出更周延的說明。最後，無論從理性的規範性著手，或從法律計畫本身特定的規範性理由出發，都很難證成法律總是給予我們去作它所要求的行動的理由，因而導致在法律計畫理論下，呈現法律是沒有規範性的結果。

關鍵字

法律計畫理論 ； 計畫實證主義 ； 道德目標命題 ； 法律的規範性 ； 工具理性 ； 理性的規範性 ； 合法性環境 ； 行動理由

並列摘要

The question of “what is law” is the core issue in Anglo-American jurisprudence. As developed for half a century, it further extends to issues about the nature of law and the normativity of law in which the theoretical confrontation between legal positivism and anti-legal positivism is the most controversial and interesting topic. Legal positivism denies law as a kind of political morality and strives to depict it as a specific entity distinct from morality by trying to justify the nature of law as a matter of command, rule or normative statement.
In 2011, Scott Shapiro develops another account: Law as Plan. He constructs the Plan Theory of Law and claims it ‘Plan Positivism’, which has been recognized to be a plentiful, innovative and novel achievement in this field. Thus, I choose it as the research topic of this thesis. The main theme of my thesis focuses on the analysis of the nature of law from Plan Theory and renders some diagnoses and reflection upon it. Furthermore, I will examine the most obscure part of the Plan Theory, i.e., the normativity of law, and attempt to address my critiques respectively.
In my view, legal theory and philosophy of action have been in high convergence since Hart to Shapiro. In this way, the study of “What is Law” is equivalent to the study of “What are people (social members) doing”. In addition, if Plan Theory aims to justify that the best understanding and interpretation of law is plan and sticks to the position of Plan Positivism, it at least needs to elaborate in detail on the compatibility between Moral Aim Thesis and Separability Thesis. Finally, whether in the perspective of the normativity of rationality or the specific normative reasons arising from the law itself, it is difficult to justify that law always gives us reasons to do what it requires us to do. Accordingly, law seems have no normativity at all.

並列關鍵字

plan theory of law ； plan positivism ； moral aim thesis ； normativity of law ； instrumental rationality ； normativity of rationality ； circumstances of legality ； reason for action

參考文獻

Austin, John. 1995. The Province of Jurisprudence Determined , Wilfrid E. Rumble ed., Cambridge University Press.

Bratman, Michael. 1992. Shared Cooperative Activity, in The Philosophical Review ,Volume 101, Issue 2.

───. 1999. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, Center for the Study of Language and Information.

───. 2009. Intention, Belief, and Instrumental Rationality, in Reasons for Action, David Sobel & Steven Wall, eds.

───. 2009. Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical, in Spheres of Reason.