董事會結構與自願性財務預測之關聯性

The Association between Boards Structure and the Properties of Management Voluntary Earnings Forecasts

陳美華(Mei-Hua Chen)

指導教授 ： 曹壽民

國立中央大學/管理學院/企業管理學系碩士在職專班/碩士(2011年)

摘要

本研究探討董事會結構與自願性財務預測的關聯性。係以台灣上市(櫃)公司為研究對象，資料來源取自TEJ資料庫，研究期間自2005至 2007年止， 共計 3年。本文之研究方法採用邏輯斯迴歸、普瓦松迴歸及一般多元迴歸，主要目的在於檢測董事會結構對自願性財務預測揭露意願及品質之影響，我們以是否揭露及揭露次數來衡量自願性財務預測揭露意願，以預測誤差及樂觀性來衡量自願性財務預測品質，另外以(1)董事長兼總經理; (2)董事會規模; (3)內部董事席次比率(4)外部董事持股比率來衡量董事會結構。
　　董事會結構對自願性財務預測揭露意願之實證結果發現 (1) 董事長兼總經理對於自願性財務預測揭露意願呈負相關但不顯著； (2) 董事會規模對於自願性財務預測揭露意願呈顯著正相關； (3) 內部董事席次比率對於自願性財務預測揭露意願呈顯著負相關，(4) 外部董事持股比率對於自願性財務預測揭露意願呈顯著正相關，另外董事會結構對自願性財務預測品質之實證結果發現(1) 董事長兼總經理對於自願性財務預測預測品質皆不顯著; (2) 董事會規模對於自願性財務預測品質亦皆不顯著; (3) 內部董事席次比率對於自願性財務預測呈顯著負相關即準確度較高，且較保守; (4) 外部董事持股比率對於自願性財務預測品質皆不顯著。

關鍵字

自願性財務預測 ； 董事會結構

並列摘要

This research investigates the association between boards structure and voluntary earnings forecasts. The samples are selected from companies listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange. I obtain boards structure & the properties of management voluntary earnings forecasts data from the TEJ database. The data covers the period from 2005 to 2007, total 3 years. I use the Logistic, Poisson & OLS regressions analyses as methodology here. The purposes of this paper are a) investigate whether firms expose earnings forecasts or not and the exposition frequencies will impact the voluntary earnings forecasts or not? b) investigate whether forecast accuracy & bias will impact the quality of voluntary earnings forecasts or not? We use 4 main variables to weigh the boards structure. (1) Chairman concurrently general manager; (2) board size; (3) inside directors seat ratio (4) outside directors own stocks ratio.
　　We find that the boards structure to the voluntary earnings forecasts exposition will (1) Firms with chairman concurrently general manager are less likely to issue the voluntary earnings forecasts, but non conspicuousness; (2) Firms with greater board size are more likely to issue the voluntary earnings forecasts and conspicuousness; (3) Firms with a greater percentage of inside directors seat ratio are less likely to issue the voluntary earnings forecasts, but conspicuousness; (4) Firms with a greater percentage of outside directors own stocks ratio are more likely to issue the voluntary earnings forecasts and conspicuousness。 In addition, we find the boards structure to the voluntary earnings forecasts quality (1) Firms with chairman concurrently general manager are non conspicuousness; (2) Firms with greater board size are non conspicuousness; (3) Firms with a greater percentage of inside directors seat ratio are more accurate and less optimistically; (4) Firms with a greater percentage of outside directors own stocks ratio are non conspicuousness.

並列關鍵字

Boards Structure ； Management voluntary earnings forecasts

參考文獻

2. 林維珩、盧鎮瑋，2005，股價對強制性財務預測反應之效率性研究，會計評論，第41期，頁53-75。

3. 林維珩、陳昭蓉，2005，股票市場對強制性財務預測誤差預期之研究，管理學報，第22卷，第5期，頁585-606

6. 吳安妮，1993，臺灣經理人員主動揭露盈餘預測資訊內涵之實證研究，會計評論，第27期，頁76-107。

10.曹壽民，林哲弘，2009，家族企業與自願性財務預測，會計評論投稿，中央大學。　

1. Ajinkya, B. B., and Gift, M. J. 1984. Corporate managers’ earnings forecasts and symmetrical adjustments of market expectations. Journal of Accounting Research, 22 (Autumn): 425-444.