智慧財產權保護之國際政治經濟分析─以醫藥品專利之寡佔為例

The Analysis of Institution of International Political Economy on Intellectual Property Rights：The Case Study of Monopolization of Medicine Patent

羅國彥(Guo-Yan Lo)

指導教授 ： 趙文志

國立中正大學/社會科學院/戰略暨國際事務研究所/碩士(2016年)

摘要

經貿全球化開始後，國與國之間接觸更加頻繁，自1945年GATT成立，世界經濟快速增長，已開發國家為首的美國，為鞏固了全球霸權的地位，並試圖築構一套符合美國利益的國際經貿體系，開始建構國際制度，特別是智慧財產權下之專利權，美國等已開發國家挾其優勢，透過國際間談判並大舉推動智慧財產權的國際建制，再以“特別301條款”之國內立法，迫使其他貿易國家提升智慧財產權標準，並將智慧財產權納入1995年WTO《與貿易有關智慧財產權協定》（TRIPs）中，確立了各會員對智慧財產權保護的最低標準。
因智慧財產權下之專利權具有排他性，簡言之，他人未經專利權人同意下，不得製造販售，關於公共衛生人民健康之醫藥品亦是。導致部分開發中國家與低度開發國家反彈，醫藥品在專利權保護下，價格昂貴，因各國發展程度不同，其中開發中與低度開發國家難以負擔，只能透過強制授權或學名藥緩和國內之疫情，但難為長久之計。故為探究智慧財產權下之專利權制度之保護，在美國為首的已開發國家下，醫藥品專利權寡佔之發展與困境，本文爰採用國際政治經濟作探討，並以二個案作為例外之探討，研究醫藥品專利雖有例外之案例，敘述大部分之已開發國家仍掌握醫藥品專利，且難以下放技術與資源，以維持自國內發展之需。

關鍵字

專利權 ； 智慧財產權 ； 寡佔

並列摘要

Due to the world economy making a rapid growth, the connection between country and country is more frequent after 1945 inception of the GATT. Be the leader of developed country – the United States had been consolidated its position as a global hegemony, trying to build a structure in line with US interests in international trade system. US used her hegemony advantage aggressively to promote international institution of intellectual property rights, especially medicine patent rights which is under intellectual property rights. Developed countries pass through international negotiation and to set the system of intellectual property rights into action with their predominance. Moreover the United States makes the "Special 301" section of the domestic law, forcing her national trade standards to enhance intellectual property rights, and to include intellectual property in the standards of WTO in 1995 and the "Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights" (TRIPs), the member States and establishing minimum standards for intellectual property protection.
Most parts of developing countries and less developed countries against medicine to subsume under patent rights. The opposite reasons are not only the price of medicine will be unaffordable but also the patent of medicine will be exclusively. As known, it is not a permanent plan to make generic drug and force compulsory licensing of medicine patents, hence, they extremely oppose the institution, but still not work. In addition, for compensating the growing complex of the international trade, WTO has gradually inadequate to cope with, the United States opened the negotiations on a bilateral or plurilateral free trade agreements and intellectual property rights protection that were later added in the chapters of the agreement. Therefore, this paper adopts international political economy to find the dilemma on monopolization of medicine patent, even there are exception on two cases but most developed countries will still control all the resources and the technic to maintain their interests and power

並列關鍵字

Intellectual property rights ； Medicine paten ； Developed country

參考文獻

牛惠之，「世界貿易組織之SPS協定關於風險評估與風險管理之規範體系與爭端案例研究」，臺灣國際法季刊，第1卷第二期（2004年6月），頁151-236。

(二)專書篇章(Book Chapters)

許炳華，「當智慧財產權遇上人權」，衝突或共存、緊張或交融」，台灣海洋法學報，第九卷第一期（2010年6月），頁22-60。

黃章典，「克流感專利技術經強制授權」，理律法律雜誌，第2006卷第2期（2006年3月），頁3-4。

李森煙，「生物安全議定書與WTO協定：「相輔相成」的理想與現實」，科技法律透析，第21卷第2期（2009年2月），頁19-23。