為了加強上市櫃公司之公司治理,我國於2006年修正證券交易法,正式引進得以全體獨立董事組成之審計委員會取代監察人制度,且於2005年1月1日修正「公開發行公司公開財務資訊處理準則」,公司的盈餘預測由強制性改為自願性揭露,基於我國法規的變革,本研究欲探討設置審計委員會對管理當局盈餘預測與分析師預測之影響。 本研究以我國2007年至2013年上市櫃公司為研究對象,比較有無設立審計委員會對於管理當局自願發布盈餘預測意願及管理當局與分析師盈餘預測精準度之影響。並考慮審計委員會非為強制設置,可能產生自我選擇偏誤之情況,故本研究使用Heckman(1979)兩階段估計法處理審計委員會內生性問題。實證結果發現,設置審計委員會之公司,管理當局自願發布盈餘預測意願較高,且管理當局盈餘預測與分析師預測誤差程度較低。此外,本研究發現管理當局自願發布盈餘預測將提升分析師預測之精準程度。
Because of the Securities and Exchange Act amended, a company issued stock shall establish either an audit committee or a supervisor, as well as voluntary financial forecast instead of mandatory financial forecast. The purpose of this study is to exam whether the audit committee affects management voluntary earnings forecasts willingness and accuracy of forecasts. We collect data from listed firms in the Taiwan Stock Exchange during 2007-2013 and find that firms with audit committee prefer announced management voluntary earnings forecasts. Their forecasts and analyst earnings forecasts are statistically significance more accurate than firms without audit committee. Furthermore, analysts’ forecasts exhibit higher accuracy with the voluntary issuance of management forecasts.