- 學位論文
股權結構和公司價值關聯性之研究
A STUDY ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND CORPORATE VALUE
摘要
股票市場為提供公司股票發行與交易的資本市場，也是調節資金的地方，有效率的證券市場，能使資金供需移轉迅速，對經濟發展相當重要，股權結構是決定公司價值的重要因素之一，當公司上市時，新股或舊股移轉給新的所有人，會大幅改變公司的股權結構，也因而會影響了公司的價值及監督機制。因此，公司的上市事件是公司調整股權結構的最佳時機，而且其所帶來股權分散與股權易於轉讓的現象，最近幾年以來企業慢慢的往經營權與所有權分立的組織走去，希望藉著專業經理人的能力及知識讓公司經營能夠達到專業化來提高公司經營績效及價值，最後使股東的權益極大化。我們提出管理者持股與公司價值之間關係的另一種結構，因此，擴張前人使用的三次方或更簡單的關係型式。我們認為管理者持股為高水位時會再與公司價值存在非線性關係，因此管理者持股與公司價值之間為五次方的關係。當管理者持股低時，外部規範與內部控制或誘因將主導經理人行為（Fama，1980；Hart，1983；Jensen 和Ruback，1983）。在實證上Morck et al.（1988）、McConnell 和Servaes（1990）和Hermalin 和Weisbach（1991）的研究結果與此推論一致。另一方面，有一個可能是此低持股是內生的，是由於與績效有關的薪酬制度所造成，像是股票選擇權或股票給予，而不是增加持股會有高公司績效。
並列摘要
The ownership structure is an important factor in determining the value of the company, when the company is listed, the new shares or existing shares were transferred to new owners, will dramatically change the company's ownership structure, which will affect the value of the company and oversight mechanisms. The nonlinear relationship between corporate value and managerial ownership is well documented. This has been attributed to the onset of managerial entrenchment, which results in a decrease of corporate value for increasing levels of managerial holdings. We propose a new structure for this relationship that accounts for the effect of conflicting managerial incentives, and external and internal disciplinary monitoring mechanisms. Using this specification as the basis for our analysis, we provide evidence that the managerial ownership–corporate value relationship is codeterministic. This finding is at odds with recent work which reports that corporate value determines managerial ownership but not vice-versa.In this section, we propose an alternative structure to the managerial holdings–corporate value relationship and argue that the cubic, or simpler representations,used in earlier studies are unnecessarily restrictive and misspecified. The model that is presented here captures further nonlinearities in this relationship at high levels of managerial holdings and has a quintic specification. For low levels of managerial ownership, external discipline and internal controls or incentives will dominate behavior (Fama, 1980; Hart, 1983; Jensen and Ruback, 1983). Empirically, Morck et al. (1988),McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) report results consistent with this behavior for the relationship between managerial holdings and corporate value. The information in this study is based on the information of listed companies from 1990 to 2011 study, a total of 22 years, the standard deviation estimated VOL contains its own data of the previous five years, can only estimate a VOL data 1990-1994 data, the real use estimates for 1994 to 2011, and 1990-1993 four-year estimate does not come out can not be used. Therefore, the actual 711 data, estimates from 1994 to 2011 a total of 18 years, the 6612 documents of the total sample for the research firm sample number.Therefore, in this study that affect the company's equity value of managerial ownership(MO), the estimated coefficients of corporate value (Q) is significant, increase in corporate value, internal managers holding the greater，So this equation can be seen managerial ownership corporate value, so the managerial ownership is exogenous, in addition, corporate value also affects managerial ownership，Indicates corporate value on the managerial ownership of the estimated coefficient is significant, so the managerial ownership can also be endogenous, consistent with expectations.