「格物」何以「無工夫」？－聶雙江、黃久菴之比較

聶雙江（1486-1563）與黃久菴（1480-1544）都是王陽明（1472-1529）的第一代弟子，他們雖分屬浙中、江右王門，卻都主張「致知」為工夫，「格物」為效驗，跳脫長期以來關於「格物」工夫的爭論。這不但為陽明後學開出一條新途，在《大學》詮釋史上亦別具新義。然而，學界長期以來只注意到雙江的格物，對久菴的認識不夠充分，甚至沒有意識到兩人主張的相似性，並加以分析其異同。本文即為嘗試填補這個學術史上尚未受到足夠關注的重要環節。表面上看，二人均主張「立體以達用」，並強調「立體」的重要性，甚至取消了「格物」的工夫義，視之為「致知」的效驗。實則二人的差異更為顯著，簡言之，二人對於本體、體用關係、「致知」、「格物」等概念的定義和預設，均存在大小不一的落差，因此最終體現出來的「致知在格物」雖然都能解釋為「工夫→效驗」，但其運行的模式、指涉的對象、產生的成效並不相同，甚至他們想藉此解決的問題也不一樣。雙江試圖為良知的發用找到一個恆久穩固而可信賴的源頭；久菴則是想突顯本體的體用一源，及其落實於經驗世界的必須性。

關鍵字

聶雙江；黃久菴；王陽明；致知；格物

並列摘要

Among the disciples of Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472-1529), Nie Shuangjiang 聶雙江 (1486-1563) and Huang Jiu'an 黃久菴 (1480-1544) asserted that the term ＂gewu＂格物 (investigation of things) does not mean a method of self-cultivation but is rather an adjective that describes the accomplishment of ＂zhizhi＂致知 (awakening or extending knowledge), a meaningful new viewpoint following Zhu Xi's and Wang's interpretations of Daxue 大學 (Great Learning). Scholars have already discussed Nie's concept of ＂gewu,＂ but related studies on Huang have proven to be insufficient, even failing to discern the consistencies and differences between the two. In this article, I thus attempt to fill the gap by comparing Nie's and Huang's theories. I argue that the properties concerning ＂gewu＂ and ＂zhizhi＂ as well as ＂ti-yong＂體用 (substance-function) shared between the two disciples only superficially resemble one another. The underlying definitions, operations, and purposes of these concepts, however, exhibit certain differences, suggesting that they were resolving dissimilar matters. In short, Nie was attempting to discover a steady and reliable source for ＂liangzhi＂良知 (innate knowledge), whereas Huang desired to show the union between ＂substance＂ and ＂function＂體用一源 of noumenon, and its necessity to be implemented in the phenomenal world.