Ultimate Control and Expropriation of Minority Shareholders: New Evidence from Taiwan

最終控制者的股權與財富剝奪傾向之研究

葉銀華(Yin-Hua Yeh) ； 柯承恩(Chen-en Ko) ； 蘇裕惠(Yu- Hui Su)

《經濟論文》 31卷3期 (2003/09) Pp. 263-299

https://doi.org/10.29628/AEP.200309.0002

摘要

本文以台灣上市公司為樣本，分析最終控制者的股權結構與公司價值的關係。相較於過去的研究，我們詳細的區分最終控制者所擁有的投票權與現金流量權，並且將控制股東掌有公司經營權，分成二種對立效果：努力經營的正誘因效果與傷害公司價值的負侵佔效果。本文發現Claessens等人 (2000) 低估台灣上市公司控制股東投票權偏離現金流量權的幅度，上述結果可能是因為台灣上市公司對於最終控制者股權結構的資訊揭露並不完全所導致。我們使用聯立方程式模型分析控制股東財富剝奪傾向與公司價值的關係。實證結果發現控制股東投票權偏離現金流量權的幅度與質押比率是衡量控制股東財富剝奪傾向的兩個重要指標，且與公司價值呈現負向關係，支持傷害公司價值的負侵佔效果。再者，控制股東擁有愈多的現金流量權則公司價值愈高，支持努力經營之正誘因效果。最後，我們建議台灣上市公司在揭露股權資料時應採用最終控制 (ultimate control) 的觀念，上市公司應提供完整的資料給投資者，使投資者可以清楚分辨控制股東所擁有的投票權與現金流量權，藉以區分控制股東之正誘因效果與負侵佔效果。

關鍵字

公司治理 ； 股權結構 ； 最終控制 ； 財富剝奪

並列摘要

This paper provides further evidence to identify the ultimate controlling structure and the degree of expropriation of minority shareholders of listed companies in Taiwan. Compared with previous research, we focus on analyzing the control (voting) and cash flow rights owned by the controlling shareholder. We further distinguish two opposite effects of the controlling shareholders: the positive incentive effect and negative entrenchment effect. The findings of this paper indicate that Claessens et al. (2000) underestimate the control rights and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders and the proportion of family controlled companies in Taiwan due to insufficient disclosure of ultimate ownership structure. We adopt a simultaneous equation model to examine the relationship between the degree of expropriation of minority shareholder and corporate value. Based on our empirical results, we suggest that the deviation of control from cash-flow rights and the degree of collateralization of the stock held by controlling shareholders are two important variables in measuring the expropriation of minority shareholders. The two measurements also have a negative relationship on corporate value, supporting the negative entrenchment effect. In addition, the more cash flow rights owned by the controlling shareholder lead to higher corporate value, supporting the positive incentive effect. Finally, we suggest the regulations covering disclosure of ownership structure should adopt the concept of the ultimate control. That is, companies should provide the complete information for investors to trace and identify who owns the most votes in the companies and how many votes the controlling shareholder owns to distinguish the positive incentive effect and negative entrenchment effect of controlling shareholders.

並列關鍵字

Corporate governance ； Ownership structure ； Ultimate control ； Wealth expropriation ； Taiwan

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