本文嘗試突破傳統文獻中,僅探討單一損益操縱工具的慣例,改以將「會計方法選用」和「應計項目認列」二類損益操縱工具同時考量後,而求算出來的企業「盈餘操縱綜合指標」,作為探討國內上市公司的損益操縱行為的依據。實証結果顯示,國內企業整體而言,管理當局之損益操縱僅顯著地受到「政治成本」之影響。至於「紅利計畫」與「債務契約條款」等兩項損益操縱誘因之影響力則並不顯著。不過當本研究之樣本依其上市先後順序被區分為「新上市公司」和「已上市公司」兩個子樣本後則實証研究顯示,「新上市公司」的管理當局之損益操縱行為,明顯地和國外企業一樣均是同時受到「政治成本」、「紅利計畫」及「債務條款」三個盈餘操縱誘因之顯著影響。
This study tries to simultaneously investigate the two most widely used earnings manipulation tools ”Accounting Policy Choice” and ”Accruals” Two major results are as follows: First, In Taiwan, firm as a whole, ”Political costs” is the only earnings manipulation factor that would significantly affect firm's earnings manipulation behavior. Second, when the sample is devided into two subsamples: ”newly issued” and ”not newly issued”, then all three earnings manipulation factors: ”Political costs” ”Incentive Programs” and ”Debt Covenants” become significant for the newly issued subsample.