反對黨獨大下的分立政府： 高雄縣府會關係的個案研究(1985-2003)

Divided Government under the Predominance of the Opposition Party: The Case of Kaohsiung County's Executive and Legislature Relations(1985-2003)

廖達琪(Da-Chi Liao) ； 洪澄琳(Chen-Lin Hung)

《台灣政治學刊》 8卷2期 (2004/12) Pp. 5-50

https://doi.org/10.6683/TPSR.200412.8(2).5-50

摘要

本文試圖探討反對黨獨大下的分立政府類型及對府會關係可能的影響。所以做此嚐試，是基於一方面國內地方政府的分立形態，多半顯現爲朝野政黨在議會中席次比例不對稱的狀況；另一方面，相關文獻很少對這種朝野不對稱局面做較深入、理論性的探討。
本文試圖依循Riker及Olson等的理性邏輯，推演出反對黨獨大下的四種可能分立形態： I型是反對黨過半，執政黨極少；II型是反對黨過半，執政黨一些；III型是反對黨相對多數，執政黨極少；IV型是反對黨相對多數，執政黨一些。並界定府會關係含三層面：一是府會質詢互動過和，二是府會互動結果的預算刪減幅度，三是府會互動影響的政府案提出及通過情形。同時假定行政首長依政策推動的理性目標，議員們在乎利益分配的自利理性，進行推估朝野實力在議會中極不對稱，到朝野實力較接近的不同狀況中，雙方的策略攻防，而進一步提出本文的理論預設，基本上認爲I型分立會有較好的府會互動氣氛，較低的預算刪減幅度，但較低的政府提案數及通過率，第IV型則是第I型的對立面，第II及第III型的影響情形則應介於中間。
在實例驗証上，本文是以高雄縣自餘陳月瑛主政以來到目前楊秋與縣長的十八年間分立狀況爲個案，其間因朝野政黨在議會席次上由極不對稱到較對稱的變化情形，相當能契合本文理論對反對黨獨大下分立政府所做的各式類型推演，所得結果大體能肯定本文的理論預期。

關鍵字

分立政府類型 ； 反對黨獨大 ； 府會關係 ； 高雄縣

並列摘要

The paper tries to explore the plausible types of a divided government which has a predominant opposition party in the legislature, and the influences of these divided types may exercise upon their legislature and executive relations. The main reasons for doing so are, on the one hand, Taiwan's county governments so far have had a very unbalanced seat share between their ruling and opposition party in their county councils. On the other hand, the relevant literature of divided situation.
The paper mainly deducts from Ricker&Olson's rational choice logic and suggests the following four types of divided governments which have predominant opposition parties in their legislatures. These four are: I. opposition seats are over half, the ruling party are a few. II. The opposition are over half, the ruling party are some. III. The opposition is plural, the ruling party are some. The paper also defines the Executive-Legislature relations into three dimensions: First is the atmosphere of their interaction during the question period; the second is the cutting ratio of annual budget by the council; the third refers to the these government bills. This paper also assumes that the Executive leaders' rationality is to reaalize their policy goal. Council persons are self-interested since they only care about whether or not they could distribute benefit to their own interests. Based upon these rational assumptions, this paper proposed that Type I divided government will have a better interactive atmosphere, a lower budget cutting ratio, but has a lower government bill proposing and bill passing ratios. Concernming the other three types of divided government, while type IV produces opposite outcome as comparing to type I, type II and III should fall into the middle of that of the type IV and I.
In the examination of Kaohsiung county case from 1985 to 2003, the impact of different types of predominant opposition party in the Council on the Executive-Legislature relation can quite cope with the theoretical expectation of that proposed by the paper.

並列關鍵字

Divided Government ； Predominance Opposition Party ； Executive-Legislature relations ； Kaohsiung County

參考文獻

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Alesina, Alberto,Howard Rosenthal.(1995).Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy.New York:Cambridge University Press.