選制改變前選區規模對立委分配政策提案行爲的影響

The Impact of Upcoming Changes in the Electoral System on the Initiation Behavior of Pork Barrel-related Bills from Legislators

羅清俊(Ching-Jyuhn Luor) ； 廖健良(Chien-Liang Liao)

《台灣政治學刊》 13卷1期 (2009/06) Pp. 3-53

https://doi.org/10.6683/TPSR.200906.13(1).3-53

摘要

由於第七屆立法委員選舉制度改爲單一選區兩票制並將減半，本研究觀察第六屆區域立委在分配政策提案行爲上，是否會因爲選制的即將改變而產生變化？並與第五屆區域立委截然不同？變化幅度是否會隨著選區規模的不同而有所差異？
本研究發現第五屆大型及中型選區立委的分配政策提案數量皆遠低於小型選區立委，其中又以大型選區立委的分配政策提案數量最少，代表選區規模越大，立委越沒有動機提出分配政策提案。而在第六屆立法院時期，大、中、小型選區立委之間的分配政策提案數量卻沒有顯著的差異。出現這種現象主要是因爲第六屆的中、大型選區立委在分配政策提案的數量上大幅地成長，顯著地多過於第五屆的中、大型選區立委。而小型選區立委的分配政策提案數量在五、六兩屆立法院之間並沒有顯著性的差異。這意味著來自選區規模越大的區域立委，受到選制即將改變爲單一選區與員額減少的影響也越深遠。本研究不但發現選區規模對於台灣立法委員分配政策提案行爲的顯著影響，同時也觀察到選舉制度即將改變之前就已經對國會議員分配政策提案行爲產生影響。

關鍵字

分配政策 ； 肉桶行爲 ； 選區規模 ； 分配理論 ； 選舉制度 ； 立法院

並列摘要

This paper explores the motives of legislators in seeking distributive benefits for their districts. Based on the perspective of distributive theory, the authors seek to determine whether the legislators of the Taiwan's 6(superscript th) Legislative Yuan are about to change their bill-initiation behavior, compared with the legislators of the 5(superscript th) Legislative Yuan, due to the upcoming changes in the electoral system (i.e. to reduce members by 50% and replace the SNTV by a single-member-district). The negative binomial model is used to explore the factors that would affect the bill-initiation behavior of legislators favoring distributive benefits for their districts.
The analyses of the negative binomial model reveal a significant effect of district size on the initiation of distributive bills in the 5(superscript th) Legislative Yuan. The larger the district size is, the fewer the incentives that the legislators have, to pursue distributive policy interests. However, the statistical results do not exhibit a significant effect of district size on the initiation of distributive bills in the 6(superscript th) Legislative Yuan in the sense that the discrepancies in terms of bill initiation among legislators from districts of different sizes are reduced. To be specific speaking, compared with the 5(superscript th) Legislative Yuan, legislators who are from large districts in the 6(superscript th) Legislative Yuan tend to initiate more distributive bills. The same pattern is also found among the 6(superscript th) Legislators Yuan's legislators who were elected from medium-sized of districts. However, this is not true for the legislators of small districts. These findings imply that the impact of the upcoming changes in the electoral system is more likely to be felt by the legislators who are from larger districts as opposed to those from smaller ones.
In sum, this paper finds a significant effect of district size on the legislators' distributive bill-initiation behavior. It also finds that the impact of the coming changes in the electoral system on legislative behavior is already at work before it goes into effect. These findings have implications for distributive politics in Taiwan.

並列關鍵字

distributive policy ； pork barrel behavior ； district size ； distributive theory ； electoral system ； Legislative Yuan

參考文獻

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