政府責任與課責行為：理論與測量

本文重新檢視政治課責的理論依據，即委託人與代理人理論，討論其在選舉課責的應用上可能存在的問題。本文認為人民向政府課責的前提是人民必須先認知某些事務是政府的責任，並在此前提下評估政府的施政表現，且透過選舉獎懲現任者（或連任政黨的候選人），此種獎懲過程與結果即為政治課責的表現之一。根據這些對於政治課責在理論上的修正，本文認為當民眾認為政府負責的事務相當廣泛時，較有可能對政府課責。相對地，當民眾認為政府的責任是相當有限時，則較不會將社會問題歸咎於政府或現任者。為驗證本文的理論假設，本文採用新的指標測量人民對於政府責任的認知，並以2014年高雄市長選舉和2016年新北市與台中市立法委員選舉進行分析。研究結果顯示政府責任認知與施政滿意度對於現任者支持的影響有兩種模式：其一為民眾認為政府的責任相對較大的時候，滿意現任者施政的民眾較不滿意者有較高的機率會投票給現任者（2016年新北市立委選舉）；其二為當民眾認為政府的責任範圍較有限時，施政（不）滿意度與現任者（不）支持之間並非正（負）相關（2014年高雄市長選舉和2016年的台中市立委選舉）。

關鍵字

課責；政府責任；委託人與代理人理論；測量；項目反應理論

並列摘要

When applied to a discussion of political accountability, the principal-agent theory implicitly assumes that citizens fully understand what the government is responsible for. Given their understanding of government responsibility, citizens can reward or sanction the incumbent based on the government's performance. This paper reexamines the above assumption and the applicability of the principal-agent theory in political accountability. To be specific, we investigate how citizens perceive government responsibility and how the perception influences citizens' support for the incumbent. We argue that when they regard the government as being more responsible for social problems, citizens are more likely to hold the incumbent government accountable for its performance. To test our hypothesis, we analyze data for a survey conducted in Kaohsiung City, New Taipei City, and Taichung City. The results show that the voters in New Taipei City are more likely to hold the incumbent government accountable when they think the government should be more responsible for social problems. This finding, however, does not hold in our analysis of Kaohsiung City and Taichung City.

並列關鍵字

Accountability ； Government Responsibility ； Principal-agent Theory ； Measurement ； Item Response Theory

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政府責任與課責行為：理論與測量

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