代理成本對自願性盈餘預測揭露之影響

The Effects of Agency Cost on Voluntary Disclosure of Corporate Earnings Forecasts

張瑞當(Ruey-Dang Chang) ； 方俊儒(Chun-Ju Fang) ； 朱正雄(Cheng-Shoung Chu)

《交大管理學報》 27卷2期 (2007/12) Pp. 29-53

https://doi.org/10.6401/CMR.200712.0029

摘要

本研究旨在探討代理成本對自願性盈餘預測揭露之影響，以「公司規模」與「管理當局持股比率」代表管理當局和股東之間代理成本的代理變數，而以「舉債程度」代表管理當局和債權人之間代理成本的代理變數。本研究依據台灣經濟新報(TEJ)資料庫上市櫃公司81-90年之盈餘預測資料，共計407個公司樣本，採累積Logistic迴歸模型分析，結果發現：當公司規模越大，其自願性盈餘預測揭露的意願越強，而公司舉債程度越高，自願性盈餘預測揭露的意願越低；但是，管理當局持股比率和自願性盈餘預測揭露間則沒有顯著相關。

關鍵字

代理理論 ； 代理成本 ； 自願性盈餘預測揭露

並列摘要

The purpose of the study is to investigate the effects of agency cost on voluntary disclosure of earnings forecasts. The study takes the perspective that in order to win the trust from shareholders and creditors, managers are willing to disclose earnings forecasts voluntarily. Firm size and management’s share holding percentage are adopted to represent the agency cost between managers and shareholders, while leverage represents the agency cost between managers and creditors. Empirical data of 407 listed and OTC companies were obtained from the TEJ data bank in the periord of 1992-2001. The accumulated logistic regression models indicate that the bigger the firm size is, the more willingness of the company is to engage a voluntary disclosure of earnings forecasts and the higher the leverage is, the lower the willingness is to a voluntary disclosure. However, there is no significant relationship between management's share holding percentage and voluntary disclosure of earnings forecasts.

並列關鍵字

agency theory ； agency cost ； voluntary disclosue of earnings forecasts

參考文獻

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