This paper focuses on the interest structure of rural township governance over land rights transfer in Mainland China from the view of a state-business theory. The core interests of a rural township ruling authority are composed of two items: profit transfer and profit structure. This paper suggests that rural township governments have changed from being "blind buyers" to becoming "senior rational investors"; their attitude toward markets has shifted from the explorative stage of "crossing a river by feeling one's way over the stones" to the GDP first stage, and then to the stage of cautious and rational money management. Land rights transfers in rural townships provide opportunities for political entrepreneurs to seek their self-interest, for rural township governments to seek economic interests, for government-business relationship to seek rent-seeking interests, and for government departments to seek departmental interests.
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