There always exists an information asymmetry between a borrower and a creditor. That brings about not only raising credit risk of a bank but also increasing financing cost of a firm. The result is unfavorable to the effective use of limited funds and the economic development. Therefore, a well-designed risk evaluation system may be useful for resolving or alleviating the problem of information asymmetry concerned. This study intends to analyze the impact of the risk evaluation report, prepared by an independent evaluator, on the crediting policy of a bank. Furthermore, it is also shown that the risk evaluation system can finally collapse once there exists collusion between an evaluator and a borrower.
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