風險評估報告與銀行授信決策之分析

Risk Evaluation Report and Crediting Policy

郭瑞基(Ruey-Ji Guo) ； 蔡敏華(Min-Hwa Tsai)

《當代會計》 4卷1期 (2003/05) Pp. 69-92

https://doi.org/10.6675/JCA.2003.4.1.03

摘要

借款企業與貸款銀行間一直存在著相當嚴重的資訊不對稱問題。影響所及不僅導致銀行授信風險的提高，同時亦造成企業融資成本的增加，對於資金的有效流通與經濟的持續發展產生相當不利的影響。因此，一套健全的風險評估機制的建立，或能有助於解決或減輕相關的資訊不對稱問題，對於減少代理成本、促進社會經濟繁榮將產生正面的作用。職此，本研究透過單期的決策分析，探討一份超然獨立的風險評估報告對於銀行授信決策的可能影響。此外，本研究亦對風險評估機構無法維持超然獨立時（亦即存在與借款企業勾結之可能時），其將可能導致整個風險評估機制瓦解之情況，作深入的分析與討論。

關鍵字

資訊不對稱 ； 風險評估 ； 授信決策

並列摘要

There always exists an information asymmetry between a borrower and a creditor. That brings about not only raising credit risk of a bank but also increasing financing cost of a firm. The result is unfavorable to the effective use of limited funds and the economic development. Therefore, a well-designed risk evaluation system may be useful for resolving or alleviating the problem of information asymmetry concerned. This study intends to analyze the impact of the risk evaluation report, prepared by an independent evaluator, on the crediting policy of a bank. Furthermore, it is also shown that the risk evaluation system can finally collapse once there exists collusion between an evaluator and a borrower.

並列關鍵字

Information asymmetry ； Risk evaluation ； Crediting policy

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